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MORAL DIVERSITY AND EFFICIENT BREACH
Matthew A . Seligman*
Most people think it is morally wrong to breach a contract . But sophisticated
commercial parties, like large corporations, have no objection to breaching
contracts and paying the price in damages when doing so is in their self-
interest . The literature has ignored the profound legal, economic, and norma-
tive implications of that asymmetry between individuals’ and firms’ ap-
proaches to breach . To individuals, a contract is a promise that cannot be
broken regardless of the financial stakes . For example, millions of homeown-
ers refused to breach their mortgage contracts in the aftermath of the housing
crisis even though doing so could have saved them tens or even hundreds of
thousands of dollars . Their moral beliefs led homeowners to forgo opportuni-
ties for efficient breach that firms would have seized, thus exacerbating al-
ready swelling wealth inequalities .
This Article explains this phenomenon, identifies its consequences, and ex-
amines strategies to address it . Neither ex post judicial interventions (such as
adjusting the remedies for breach) nor traditional ex ante regulatory inter-
ventions (such as disclosure requirements) will effectively address the prob-
lem . Instead, the most promising approach is a novel solution based on the
framework of choice architecture: requiring contracts to include an express
term creating an option to exit the contract and pay a fee equivalent to ex-
pectation damages . An express exit term elevates an implicit legal option into
an explicit contractual option, reframing the moral choice so individuals
would perceive exiting the contract as a morally permissible performance of
their promise rather than a morally forbidden breaking of it . The presence of
that exit term thereby aligns individuals’ perceptions of their moral obliga-
tions under the contract with sophisticated firms’ approaches to breach .
The Article concludes with new empirical evidence that demonstrates the
practical impact of an exit clause . It presents the results of two experimental
studies I performed that demonstrate the effectiveness of a mandatory exit
clause in reducing the effects of the asymmetry between individuals and
firms . Those results show that exit clauses could have substantial practical
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ble conversations and insights, I thank Oren Bar-Gill, Ryan Copus, Erik Encarnacion, Noah
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Climenko Fellow Workshop. I also thank the editors of the Michigan Law Review for their ex-
ceptional contributions.
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implications for the regulation of contracts in contexts like consumer and
mortgage contracts .
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INTRODUCTION
Individuals and firms have sharply different moral views about whether
it is permissible to breach a contract. Most people think it is wrong to breach
even if it is in their economic interest to do so.1 Contracts, in the eyes of
1 . See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Questionable Efficiency of the Efficient-Breach
Doctrine, 168 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 5 (2012); Steven Shavell, Essay, Is
Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439 (2006); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the
Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral Economics of Strategic Default, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1547
(2011) [hereinafter Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching]; Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damag-
es Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633 (2010) [hereinafter
Wilkinson-Ryan, Liquidated Damages]; Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Fault in Contracts, A Psycholog-
ical Approach, in FAULT IN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW 289 (Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat
eds., 2010); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Legal Promise and Psychological Contract, 47 WAKE FOREST
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many, are promises. When you enter a contract, people believe, you make a
promise to perform.2 And because people also tend to think that breaking a
promise is wrong,3 they think they are subject to a corresponding moral ob-
ligation to perform the contract.4 As a result, contracting parties who hold
this view will perform their express obligations under a contract even if they
would be better off economically by breaching and paying damages to their
counterparty.
But firms often don’t hold that view. Instead, they typically view a con-
tract simply as a legal obligation to perform, the violation of which is not a
moral wrong to be avoided but rather a legal contingency to be navigated.5
Justice Holmes famously claimed that “[t]he duty to keep a contract at
common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not
keep it,— and nothing else.”6 According to the view associated with Holmes,7
L. REV. 843 (2012) [hereinafter Wilkinson-Ryan, Legal Promise and Psychological Contract];
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Transferring Trust: Reciprocity Norms and Assignment of Contract, 9 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 511 (2012); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron,Moral Judgment
and Moral Heuristics in Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405 (2009); Tess Wil-
kinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1003 (2010). Other
empirical research examines the psychological operation of the underlying norm of promise-
keeping. See Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, Promises and Partnership, 74
ECONOMETRICA 1579 (2006); Christoph Vanberg, Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An
Experimental Test of Two Explanations, 76 ECONOMETRICA 1467 (2008).
2 . See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 17 (2d ed. 2015) (“[S]ince a contract is
first of all a promise, the contract must be kept because a promise must be kept . . . .”); id . at 40
(“Contract law . . . . is grounded in the primitive moral institution of promising”); see also
Charles Fried, Response, The Convergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 3
(2007) (“[C]ontract [is] rooted in, and underwritten by, the morality of promising.”).
3. Wilkinson-Ryan, Legal Promise and Psychological Contract, supra note 1, at 855–57.
That moral view is widely held among moral philosophers. See, e .g ., DAVIDHUME, A TREATISE
OF HUMAN NATURE § 3.2.5 (David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2007) (1739); IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 15, 32, 38
(Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1785); T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE
OWE TO EACH OTHER 315 (1998); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 13–18
(1955).
4 . See, e .g ., FRIED, supra note 2, at 17 (“The moralist of duty thus posits a general obli-
gation to keep promises, of which the obligation of contract will be only a special case—that
special case in which certain promises have attained legal as well as moral force.”); Jody S.
Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603, 1604 (2009)
(“A natural account of the relationship between contract and promise holds that legal liability
in contract enforces a corresponding moral responsibility for a promise.”); Wilkinson-Ryan &
Baron, supra note 1, at 405. As this Article discusses in depth, much of the debate centers on
the scope of the promise.
5 . See Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses
of the Expectation Interest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1939, 1954–55 n.32 (2011); Alan Schwartz & Robert
E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 550–56 (2003).
6. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897), reprinted in 110
HARV. L. REV. 991, 995 (1997).
7. Note that, although contemporary scholars typically associate Holmes with the view
that individuals ought to breach when it is efficient to do so, it is far from clear that Holmes
actually held that view regarding the morality of breach. Holmes, rather, purported both to
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law provides the remedy for breach of contract through expectation damag-
es, and submitting to that remedy exhausts both the moral and legal liability
of a breacher. For a Holmesian firm, then, there is no further moral obliga-
tion to perform rather than to breach and pay damages.8 As a result, the
Holmesian firm will breach and pay damages whenever it is in its interest to
do so.
This asymmetry in moral belief has profound practical consequences.
Consider the aftermath of the housing crisis in 2008. Mortgage contracts re-
quire monthly payments of the principal and interest that, over the life of the
loan, amount to much more than the original loan amount. After housing
prices plummeted in 2008, millions of homeowners owed more on their
mortgages than their houses were worth.9 Their mortgage contracts were
“underwater,” and it would have been financially beneficial for many of
them to breach those contracts. This was particularly true because many of
the contracts were from nontraditional loans, which had become popular be-
fore the crisis.10 Those loans often included balloon payments, teaser interest
rates that increased dramatically after an introductory period, and other fea-
tures that made those loans especially costly after the first several years of the
loan term.11 Underwater homeowners thus faced a choice between continu-
ing to make rapidly escalating monthly payments and breaching their mort-
gage contract. The primary consequence of breach is that the borrower must
turn over the house that served as collateral for the loan.12 When the house is
worth less than the balance of the mortgage, and thus worth much less than
the homeowner would ultimately have to pay over the life of a nontraditional
loan because of interest, the homeowner often best serves her financial inter-
ests by breaching the mortgage contract and turning over the house.
Yet hundreds of thousands—or more—of underwater homeowners re-
fused to breach their mortgage contracts. The numbers are staggering. Re-
search by the Federal Reserve indicates that only about 5% of households
with negative equity (that is, with underwater mortgages) who could afford
describe the limited role of contract law in enforcing promises and to endorse the view that law
ought to be designed to account for the amoral “bad man.”
8 . See O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 301 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881)
(“The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the prom-
isor pay damages if the promised event does not come to pass.”).
9. Les Christie, 7 .5 Million Homeowners ‘Underwater,’ CNN (Oct. 31, 2008, 8:13 AM),
https://money.cnn.com/2008/10/30/real_estate/underwater_borrowers/index.htm [https://
perma.cc/M3VL-GZE3].
10 . See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Con-
tracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1096–1118 (2009).
11 . See id . at 1076–77.
12. In some states, lenders may also seek a deficiency judgment for the difference be-
tween the loan amount and the current value of the house if the former exceeds the latter.
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to make their monthly payments13 chose to default on their mortgages.14 If a
million homeowners could have saved $100,000 each by walking away from
their underwater mortgages, in aggregate their choices not to do so cost
them $100 billion. Homeowners incurred that astounding cost—to the direct
benefit of large financial institutions—in large part because of their per-
ceived moral obligation to make good on the promise they made to pay their
mortgage.15 Those same large financial institutions, by contrast, breached
their own contractual obligations—both to the homeowners who were going
underwater and to the investors to whom they sold securitized mortgages.16
This Article thus examines a question the literature has neither recog-
nized nor addressed: how the law and regulation of contracts should account
for the fact that legal actors are guided by differing views about the moral
permissibility of breach. The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I situates
the phenomenon of moral diversity within the philosophical and economic
debate about the morality of breach. It shows that the debate revolves around
a disagreement about the moral scope of the promise generated by a facially
unqualified contract—that is, a contract that states a primary obligation to
perform without providing an explicit alternative like a liquidated-damages
clause. Some theorists view such contracts to give rise to categorical promis-
es, but others take those contracts to give rise only to promises-in-the-
alternative to perform or pay. That disagreement about the moral scope of a
promise, in turn, mirrors the moral diversity among contracting parties: in-
dividuals, but not firms, think that a contract generates a promise to per-
form, not a promise to perform or pay.
Part II presents recent empirical research revealing the asymmetry in
moral belief among different types of parties regarding the moral permissi-
bility of breach. Section II.A presents the experimental evidence supporting
the conclusion that individual actors tend to view breach as immoral. It ex-
tracts from that research two further important conclusions: first, that even
among individuals there is substantial heterogeneity in moral belief about
breach; and second, that individuals tend to determine the moral scope of
their contractual promise by reference to the express terms of the contract.
Section II.B presents the evidence that sophisticated parties like commercial
firms tend to view a contract as generating alternative options to perform or
13. Households with negative equity who can’t afford their monthly payments are
forced to default; those with negative equity who can afford their monthly payments are those
who face a real decision of whether or not to breach.
14. Kristopher S. Gerardi, Kyle F. Herkenhoff, Lee E. Ohanian & Paul S. Willen, Can’t
Pay or Won’t Pay? Unemployment, Negative Equity, and Strategic Default 25 (Bos. Fed. Re-
serve, Working Paper No. 15–13, 2015), https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/research-
department-working-paper/2015/cant-pay-or-wont-pay-unemployment-negative-equity-and-
strategic-default.aspx [https://perma.cc/8ZU9-WDDQ].
15 . SeeWilkinson-Ryan, Breaching, supra note 1.
16 . See generally Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and
the Social Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971 (2010).
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to pay. It presents both the experimental evidence on the breaching beliefs
and behavior of sophisticated commercial actors and the theoretical consid-
erations that have led many scholars to conclude that such commercial ac-
tors tend to behave as Holmesians.
Part III argues that this asymmetry is normatively problematic. This Part
addresses two normative frameworks: economic efficiency, and fairness and
distribution. Section III.A argues that the existing legal framework, in con-
junction with individuals’ moral beliefs, results in those individuals forgoing
efficient breaches. That legal framework thus leads to outcomes that are not
Pareto optimal and fails to maximize social welfare. Section III.A then con-
siders and rejects the counterargument that some of the forgone breaches
would have been opportunistic but not efficient. Section III.B argues that the
existing legal framework is distributionally unfair because it facilitates so-
phisticated commercial actors to systematically exercise economically advan-
tageous legal options that individuals with different moral beliefs would view
as morally foreclosed. The distributional consequences are problematic both
vertically, between moralist individuals and Holmesian sophisticated com-
mercial actors, and horizontally, between individuals who will breach and
those who refuse to breach on moral grounds. The Part then considers and
largely rejects the objection that the market will eliminate the distributional
disadvantage for the moralist by pricing contracts between firms and indi-
viduals to account for individuals’ propensity not to breach on moral
grounds.
Part IV proposes a novel solution to the problem of moral diversity
about breach based on the conceptual framework of choice architecture and
demonstrates the solution’s viability using empirical data from two new
studies I performed. Sections IV.A and IV.B consider the traditional tools
the law might use to address the asymmetry: reducing expectation damages
to induce individual moralists to breach, adopting specific performance as
remedy for breach to require sophisticated Holmesians to perform, and
providing disclosure requirements to inform individuals of their legal rights.
The Sections show how these tools would be ineffective to address moral di-
versity and efficient breach. Section IV.C then presents a proposal based on
the conceptual framework of choice architecture. My proposal requires con-
tracts to include an exit clause that creates a contractual option not to per-
form and to pay instead. Because individuals judge the scope of the promise
arising from a contract based on the contract’s express terms, this proposal
would alter the substance of individual moralists’ perceived moral obligation
to align with the view of sophisticated Holmesians. Finally, this Part presents
the results of two new experimental studies I performed that demonstrate
the impact of exit clauses. The first study indicates that individuals are more
willing to exercise an exit clause than they are to breach a contract with a
liquidated-damages clause or a facially unqualified contract with neither an
exit clause nor a liquidated-damages clause. The second study indicates that
individuals are also more willing to exercise an exit option in a mortgage
than they are to default on a mortgage without an exit clause. Indeed, the da-
ta indicates that millions more homeowners with underwater mortgages
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might have strategically breached during the housing crisis if mortgage con-
tracts contained exit clauses. These empirical results suggest that a mandato-
ry exit clause could be an effective solution to the problem of moral diversity
about breach in a wide range of contractual contexts.
I. THEMORAL FOUNDATIONS OFCONTRACT LAW
A. Contracts as Promises and the Morality of Breach
A dominant philosophical theory of contract law grounds the normative
justification of contract doctrine in the moral obligation to keep promises.
Contracts, like promises, create duties that we take upon ourselves. One
must enter a contract and one must make a promise in order to be bound to
perform. Promissory morality concerns content-neutral obligations that
moral agents voluntarily assume, distinct from and beyond the moral duties
we owe to all others simply by virtue of their and our own statuses as moral
agents. Similarly, contract law enforces only those legal obligations we vol-
untarily assume, leaving tort and criminal law to enforce mandatory legal
duties. Doctrine expressly embraces the foundation of contract in the moral
concept of promise. The Restatement defines a contract as a legally enforce-
able promise.17 It grounds that conception of contract in the “sanctity of con-
tract and the resulting moral obligation to honor one’s promises.”18 Courts
and scholars accordingly routinely refer to the parties to a contract as the
“promisor” and the “promisee.” In Charles Fried’s canonical formulation,
“[t]he promise principle,” according to “which persons may impose on
themselves obligations where none existed before,” “is the moral basis of
contract law.”19
If the normative foundation of contract doctrine is promissory morality,
then contract law serves to enforce the moral obligation to keep promises.
Fried maintained that a contract “is first of all a promise,” and therefore “the
contract must be kept because a promise must be kept.”20 In his view, the law
should enforce contracts because it should respect individuals’ moral capaci-
ty to bind themselves through their promises.21 Fried further recognized that
“promissory obligation . . . ha[s] its roots in [the] deeper moral soil” of “trust
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A contract is a
promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the perfor-
mance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”).
18. Id . ch. 16, Introductory Note.
19. FRIED, supra note 2, at 1; id . at 40 (contract is “grounded in the primitive moral in-
stitution of promising”); see also Fried, supra note 2, at 3 (“[C]ontract [is] rooted in, and un-
derwritten by, the morality of promising . . . .”).
20. FRIED, supra note 2, at 17.
21 . Id . at 2 (arguing that contract law’s enforcement of voluntary promises is “a fair im-
plication of liberal individualism” because it “carries to its natural conclusion the liberal prem-
ise that individuals have rights” by “respect[ing] the dispositions individuals make of their
rights”).
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and respect for persons.”22 Accordingly, on Fried’s view, if the law failed to
enforce contracts, it would fail to respect our moral agency and autonomy.23
Other scholars have similarly found the normative basis of contract in the
morality of promising.24
Nevertheless, although the moral duty not to break a promise absent an
adequate excuse is widely recognized, the existence of a moral duty not to
breach a contract is neither free from debate nor clearly reflected in doctrine.
The default and dominant remedy in contract law is expectation damages.25
Specific performance is available only in rare circumstances,26 and punitive
damages are almost never awarded.27 Contract doctrine’s remedies are thus
designed to put the promisee in a position comparable (though not identical)
to the one he would have been in had the breaching promisor performed the
contractual promise by awarding only the monetary equivalent of perfor-
mance.28 Seana Shiffrin recently criticized orthodox doctrine on the ground
that it thereby fails to treat breach as a moral wrong: “If contract law ran
parallel to morality, then contract law would—as the norms of promises
do—require that promisors keep their promises as opposed merely to paying
off their promisees.”29 But, she notes, contract doctrine “diverges from mo-
rality in this respect” because its “dominant remedy is not specific perfor-
mance but expectation damages.”30 Accordingly, many scholars believe that
contract doctrine diverges from promissory morality by permitting what
morality condemns.
The tension between promissory morality and contract doctrine’s reme-
dies finds its sharpest expression in the theory of efficient breach, which not
only fails to condemn breach—in certain circumstances, it embraces it. Tra-
ditional economic analysis of law relies on the theory of efficient breach to
22. Charles Fried, The Ambitions of Contract as Promise, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OFCONTRACT LAW 17, 21 (Gregory Klass et al. eds., 2014).
23. In a similar vein, Jody Kraus recently argued that “ ‘respect for a person’s autonomy
[and] respect for his unfettered voluntary choice as the sole rightful determinant of his actions
except where the interests of others need protection from him’ . . . largely reconciles contract
and promise.” Kraus, supra note 4, at 1608, 1648 (quoting 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL
LIMITS OF THECRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF 68 (1989)).
24 . See, e .g ., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120
HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONTRACTS § 347 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
26 . Id . § 359 (“Specific performance or an injunction will not be ordered if damages
would be adequate to protect the expectation interest of the injured party.”).
27 . See id. § 355 (“Punitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless
the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recovera-
ble.”).
28 . Id . § 344, cmt. a (“[The] ‘expectation interest’ . . . is [the] interest in having the bene-
fit of [the] bargain by being put in as good a position as [the promisee] would have been in had
the contract been performed.”).
29. Shiffrin, supra note 24, at 722.
30 . Id . at 722–23.
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defend orthodox contract doctrine’s remedies,31 on the ground that expecta-
tion damages provide an incentive to breach when and only when breach
and payment of damages would be Pareto optimal.32 The promisor will per-
form unless the benefit of breaching exceeds his liability in damages.33 The
expectation remedy ensures that liability is sufficient to guarantee that his
counterparty is at least as well-off as he would have been with performance.34
For example, if I contract with you to shovel snow from your walk for $10,
but my car breaks down and emergency repairs would cost $100, we both
will be at least as well off if I breach our contract and pay you enough money
to put you in as good a position as you would have been had I shoveled your
walk as promised. Contract doctrine requires that payment from breaching
promisor to disappointed promisee amount to expectation damages. Legal
and economic scholars have developed the theory of efficient breach far be-
yond that original simplistic model to incorporate second-order considera-
tions like the effect of choice of remedy on prices and the role of transaction
31 . See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 33–36
(4th ed. 2011).
32 . See Gregory Klass, Efficient Breach, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OFCONTRACT
LAW, supra note 22, at 362, 362–66 (describing the “simplest version of the [efficient breach]
theory recommends expectation damages because expectation damages give parties a reason to
perform when and only when performance will increase overall social welfare”); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 128–38 (9th ed. 2014); Charles J. Goetz &
Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261
(1980); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies,
57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683 (1986). Economists outside the legal academy often bypass reliance on
the maximization of aggregate social welfare in favor of a focus solely on Pareto optimality. See
generally LOUISKAPLOW& STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESSVERSUSWELFARE 28–38 & n.41 (2002).
Pareto-optimal outcomes are those in which no party can be made better off without making
another party worse off. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093–94 (1972)
(“Economic efficiency asks that we choose the set of entitlements which would lead to that al-
location of resources which could not be improved in the sense that a further change would
not so improve the condition of those who gained by it that they could compensate those who
lost from it and still be better off than before. This is often called Pareto optimality.”). As a re-
sult, Pareto-optimal outcomes often maximize aggregate welfare. But endorsing Pareto-
optimal outcomes need not rely on utilitarianism as a moral philosophy. For example, a con-
tract theorist might endorse the expectation remedy because no party would prefer a different
remedy. The ultimate normative foundation of that endorsement need not be the pursuit of
maximizing aggregate welfare, but rather the principle that a legal rule governing the private
interactions between two parties should be the rule that both parties prefer. That latter princi-
ple might be justified on, for example, a conception of freedom or autonomy. As a result, a
normative framework that embraces Pareto optimality is not necessarily wedded to utilitarian-
ism. This subtlety does not affect the analysis in this Article.
33. Shavell, supra note 1, at 441 (“[I]f the party in breach must pay damages, we can
make an important inference: This party would not have been willing to commit breach unless
the cost of performing (or the benefit of not performing) in the contingency exceeded the bur-
den of damages.”).
34 . See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages
(pt. 1), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 54 (1936) (the aim of the expectation interest is to put the plaintiff in
“as good a position as he would have occupied had the defendant performed his promise”).
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costs on parties’ preferences among remedies. But the fundamental moral
structure underlying sophisticated versions of the theory of efficient breach
remains unchanged: contract law should permit breach if, and to the extent
that, breach would be Pareto optimal and would thus increase social welfare.
The theory of efficient breach has a distinguished pedigree that shades
the economic defense of the expectation remedy into the morality of a prom-
isor’s breach. The “Holmesian heresy” that “[t]he duty to keep a contract at
common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not
keep it—and nothing else”35 both captures contract doctrine’s long-standing
apparent embrace of the efficient-breach theory and reveals the latent ten-
sion between the doctrine and its theoretical foundations in promissory mo-
rality. The moral duty to keep a promise is not discharged by breaking the
promise and then paying off the victim of your misdeed. But as Shiffrin ob-
serves, contract doctrine’s preference for expectation damages over other
remedies, including specific performance, appears to accept precisely that.36
The theory of efficient breach, in the eyes of some of its proponents,37 con-
verts the economic argument that the expectation remedy is efficient into the
moral argument that people ought to breach and pay damages when it is in
their interest to do so. The efficiency-driven moral theory,38 which recom-
mends expectation damages as a matter of public policy, may be taken even
further to excuse breach as a matter of private morality.39 That traditional
economic analysis and its underlying moral theory of efficiency thus provide
a theoretical foundation for the Holmesian view of the morality of breach
and, in the process, apparently rejects the moral condemnation of breaking a
promise.
B. Convergence Theory and the Revisionist Move
Recent defenses of the Holmesian view of the morality of breach take a
different approach. They reject the apparent conflict between promissory
morality and economic efficiency, arguing that the expectation remedy is
consistent with the moral obligation to keep promises. Contemporary con-
tract theorists thus divide into two camps regarding the relationship between
contract doctrine and promissory morality: (1) divergence theorists, who ar-
gue that orthodox contract doctrine conflicts with the requirements of
promissory morality because the doctrine permits and, indeed, encourages
breaking promises through efficient breach; and (2) convergence theorists,
who, by contrast defend orthodox contract doctrine on the ground that it
35. Gregory Klass, Response, To Perform or Pay Damages, 98 VA. L. REV. 143, 152
(2012) (quoting Holmes, supra note 6).
36 . See Shiffrin, supra note 24, at 722–23.
37 . See, e .g ., Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 1349 (2009).
38. As noted above, Pareto optimality may be based on a utilitarian or welfarist moral
theory, but it need not be. See supra note 32.
39 . See Posner, supra note 37.
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aligns with the moral requirements of promising. Both therefore agree that
contract doctrine should conform with the requirements of promissory mo-
rality. They disagree about whether it does so.
Traditional versions of the divergence theory are based on the straight-
forward idea that contract doctrine fails to enforce the requirements of
promissory morality.40 Implicit in that traditional version of the divergence
theory is the view that contract doctrine should prohibit or punish breach
simply because it is morally wrong.41 But even if you think “the law should
not aim to enforce interpersonal morality as such,” as Shiffrin argues, one
may still hold that the “law’s content should [nonetheless] be compatible
with the conditions necessary for moral agency to flourish.”42 Through its
embrace of the Holmesian view of breach, orthodox contract doctrine on her
view “fail[s] to support the morally decent person” and “contribute[s] to a
legal and social culture that is difficult for the morally decent person to ac-
cept.”43 The core of a divergence theory, of either the traditional variety or
Shiffrin’s subtler variety, is that orthodox contract doctrine is morally un-
supportable and must be reformed in light of its conflict with promissory
morality.
Contemporary convergence theorists similarly presuppose that “the jus-
tification of [contract doctrine] turns, at least in part, on whether the legal
rights and duties it recognizes correspond to individual moral rights and re-
sponsibilities.”44 That justification thus depends on “whether the legal rights
and duties recognized by contract correspond to the moral rights and re-
sponsibilities created by promise.”45 In this respect, contemporary conver-
gence theorists part ways with earlier defenders of orthodox contract doc-
trine. Those earlier scholars argued that an expectation remedy is
appropriate solely because it properly incentivizes breaches leading to Pare-
to-optimal outcomes and thus higher social welfare. Their view conceded a
conflict between the theory of efficient breach and promissory morality, and
it proceeded to argue (or assume) that efficiency trumps any moral obliga-
tion to keep a promise. Contemporary convergence theorists, by contrast,
40 . See, e .g ., Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies—Efficiency, Equity,
and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (1981).
41 . See Kraus, supra note 4, at 1611–12 n.20 (discussing various normative political the-
ories that underwrite the claim that doctrine should correspond to the requirements of indi-
vidual morality).
42. Shiffrin, supra note 24, at 710; see also Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be
Immoral?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1551 (2009); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Must I Mean What You
Think I Should Have Said?, 98 VA. L. REV. 159 (2012).
43. Shiffrin, supra note 24, at 710. In particular, she claims, the “divergence [of doctrine
and interpersonal morality] raises questions about how the moral agent is to navigate both the
legal and moral systems” because a morally decent person will be torn between the normative
rationales of promissory morality and the conflicting rationales implicit in contract doctrine.
Id . at 709.
44. Kraus, supra note 4, at 1611.
45 . Id . at 1606.
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endorse (or at least, do not dispute) what Kraus calls the “correspondence”
view—that contract doctrine ought to align with promissory morality—and
further argue that it does. These scholars thus argue that the initial critical
intuition, voiced by Shiffrin and others, that contract law’s expectation rem-
edy conflicts with the requirements of promissory morality is mistaken.
Convergence theorists’ defense of the Holmesian view requires them to
make a choice: they must reject one of a pair of premises, both of which hold
intuitive appeal. The first premise is that a contract stating an obligation to
perform generates a corresponding promise to perform rather than merely a
promise in the alternative to perform or to pay damages. This first premise
concerns the substantive scope of the primary moral obligation arising from
the contract. The second premise is that the moral obligations arising from a
promise are not satisfied by breaking the promise and compensating the
promisee: that paying off the promisee is not a morally adequate response to
the moral violation of breaking a promise. This second premise thus con-
cerns not the content of the primary promise but rather the moral remedy
for its breach. If these premises are correct, then a facially unqualified con-
tract generates an unqualified moral obligation to perform, and the required
moral remedy for the violation of that promise is performance rather than
payment. These two premises thus jointly entail that the expectation remedy
fails to correspond to the moral rights and obligations of the contracting par-
ties.
Rejecting either of these premises requires a revisionist move. That is,
the convergence theorist must offer interpretations of the terms of contracts
that differ from the interpretations that prior scholars had assumed and that
the express terms of the contract may suggest. A facially unqualified contract
appears, at first glance, to generate an unqualified promise to perform and to
require performance rather than mere compensation as a moral remedy for
the breach of that promise. To overcome this appearance, the convergence
theorists’ revisionist move denies either the first premise regarding the sub-
stantive scope of the promise or the second premise regarding the moral
remedy for breaking the promise. In either case, the convergence theorist
must offer a revisionist account of the moral obligations arising from a fa-
cially unqualified contract.
Law and economics scholars tend to take the first approach, reconceiv-
ing the substantive scope of the contract’s moral obligation. Steven Shavell
deploys a revisionist move that interprets facially unqualified contracts to
contain gaps corresponding to “contingencies”—that is, factual scenarios in
which performance may become more costly (or less advantageous) than
breach.46 For Shavell, a contract to shovel snow is incomplete with respect to
46. Steven Shavell, Why Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral Given the Incomplete-
ness of Contracts, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1570–72 (2009) [hereinafter Shavell, Why Breach of
Contract May Not Be Immoral Given the Incompleteness of Contracts]; see also KAPLOW &
SHAVELL, supra note 32, at 155–223; Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract,
11 BELL J. ECON. 466, 466–69 (1980); Shavell, supra note 1.
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the contingency that the promisor’s car is stolen when the contract does not
mention the possibility of theft—that is, the contract itself simply doesn’t
address the possibility that the promisor is unable to shovel as he had prom-
ised (except at great cost) because his car was stolen.47 Shavell does not dis-
pute that it is immoral for a promisor to breach an express term of a contract
because “if a contract provides explicitly for a contingency, then the moral
duty to perform in that contingency is governed by the contract.”48 But be-
cause contracts are typically incomplete, the promise generated by the con-
tract itself is silent with respect to those gaps.49 As a result, he argues, both
morality and the law should imply into a gap in an incomplete contract a
term that corresponds to the term the parties would have chosen had they
addressed the contingency.50 Those gaps often correspond to contingencies
where breach is efficient, and Shavell concludes the parties would have cho-
sen a term to fill those gaps permitting nonperformance and payment of
damages. Accordingly, on this view, nonperformance is not immoral.
Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz’s version of the convergence theo-
ry takes this first approach even further. Where Shavell’s revisionist interpre-
tation of a contract found gaps where none appear on the face of the con-
tract, Markovits and Schwartz find actual terms permitting payment in lieu
of performance. On their view, “[c]ontracts that are silent about remedies
should be read to make dual performance promises.”51 They hypothesize that
“contracts typically impose alternative obligations on the promisor: either to
supply goods or services for a specified price or to transfer to the promisee
the gain the promisee would have made had those goods or services been
supplied.”52 This, too, is a revisionist move. Markovits and Schwartz argue
that, accounting for transaction and other costs, sophisticated parties53
47. Steven Shavell, Why Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral Given the Incomplete-
ness of Contracts, supra note 46, at 1571 (“[B]ecause the contract does not mention theft explic-
itly, I consider the contract to be incomplete as to that contingency.”).
48 . Id . at 1570.
49 . See Shavell, supra note 1, at 441 (“[If a] particular contingency that obtained [was
not] explicitly addressed in the contract” then “one will not know directly from the contract
whether the parties would have wanted performance in the contingency, and thus, whether the
breach should be considered wrongful.”).
50. Shavell, Why Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral Given the Incompleteness of
Contracts, supra note 46, at 1570 (“[I]f a contract is incomplete in the sense that it does not
provide explicitly for a contingency, then the moral duty to perform in the contingency is gov-
erned by what a completely detailed contract addressing the contingency would have stipulat-
ed.” (emphasis added)).
51. Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, (In)Efficient Breach of Contract, in 2 THE
OXFORDHANDBOOK OF LAWAND ECONOMICS 20, 28 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017).
52. Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1948.
53. Markovits and Schwartz expressly limit the dual performance hypothesis by assum-
ing that “[c]ontracting parties are sophisticated and rational” and “make the contractual choic-
es that maximize their expected profits.” Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, Essay, The Expec-
tation Remedy Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 1093, 1093 (2012) (citing Markovits & Schwartz, supra
note 5, at 1055–56). That limitation is critical in this Article’s analysis.
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would prefer a contract that permits the promisor to perform or pay damag-
es. They then infer from that economic logic that sophisticated parties actu-
ally agree to a contract in the alternative even when the contract is facially
unqualified.54 This conflicts with Shavell’s view, according to which the par-
ties would have agreed to a term permitting efficient nonperformance—but,
because the contract is silent on the matter, did not actually come to that
agreement. In Markovits and Schwartz’s interpretation, by contrast, con-
tracts that may appear on their face to not provide an option to pay instead
of perform in fact include such an option.55 As a result, paying expectation
damages is not actually a breach at all—but rather an alternative way of per-
forming the contract.56
Jody Kraus’s convergence theory takes the second approach to the revi-
sionist move: focusing on the contractual promise’s implicit moral remedies
rather than reinterpreting the substantive scope of that promise. Kraus’s core
insight is that individuals retain control over not only the content of their
primary promise, but also the secondary moral obligations that arise from a
party breaking that primary promise. In other words, in making a promise
we get to decide not only what we promise to do but also what we owe each
other if we break that promise. His defense of the expectation remedy rests
on the claim that “most contracting parties will find it mutually beneficial to
permit the promisor, both legally and morally, to pay damages as an alterna-
tive to performing the promised act.”57 His approach thus makes a revision-
ist move of its own. In his view, sophisticated “parties use the remedial de-
fault rules of contract to specify a morally acceptable alternative to
performance of their promised act instead of writing an explicit alternative
54. Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1987 (“In the typical case, the promisee’s
expected return from contracting is maximized under contracts that make alternative promis-
es. Promisees thus should be taken to have made such contracts unless the evidence proves
otherwise.”).
55 . Id . at 1978 (“[T]he transfer term arises out of the parties’ actual intentions and not
just out of intentions that it would be rational for them to have or fair to impute to them.”
(emphasis added)). Markovits and Schwartz suggest that “[t]he transfer promise is memorial-
ized in the liability rule contract through the price term” and thus, by agreeing to a facially un-
qualified contract at a particular price, the parties implicitly and “in fact” agree to a promise in
the alternative. Id .
56. On that basis, Markovits and Schwartz lay claim to the assertion in the title of their
article:
Under the hypothesis, a promisor who fails to deliver the promised goods or ser-
vices but instead transfers the gain to her promisee performs rather than breaches.
The promisor breaches only if she neither delivers nor pays. A breach in this sense
contradicts the promisee’s actual expectation—to receive goods or money—and
thus reduces agents’ incentives to organize their economic affairs under contracts.
On this view, ‘efficient breach’ theory not only is vacuous; ‘efficient breach’ itself is
a myth, because no true breach is efficient.
Id . at 1948–49 (third emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
57. Kraus, supra note 4, at 1638 (emphasis added).
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promise contract.”58 Thus, even when a contract is facially unqualified,
“many parties—and most commercially sophisticated parties—will intend
and understand the promisor to be discharging his moral obligation by
compensating the promisee, rather than paying damages for breach of a
moral obligation.”59 Kraus’s version of the convergence theory differs from
Shavell’s or Markovits and Schwartz’s view because, according to Kraus, fail-
ing to perform the obligation under a contract remains a moral wrong. But
Kraus proposes that, for many parties, the moral remedy for that wrong is
simply payment.60
Each revisionist’s move directs focus on reinterpreting the content of a
facially unqualified contract. At this stage in the debate, it appears that eve-
ryone agrees that there is a moral obligation to do whatever the contract re-
quires. The disagreement focuses instead on what those requirements are.61
Divergence theorists say contracts require people to perform.62 Convergence
theorists say contracts require people only to perform or pay.63 As Barbara
Fried remarked, “Those intuitions may well be right much of the time. But
right or wrong, they are an exercise in contract interpretation, not first-order
morality.”64 The state of the philosophical debate thus invites an empirical
inquiry into how contracting parties themselves understand the scope of the
promises they make and receive in contracts. In the next Part, this Article
turns to the existing attempts to answer that question.
II. THEASYMMETRY INMORALBELIEFABOUT BREACH
The philosophical debate between correspondence theorists and diver-
gence theorists is a dispute about the moral scope of the promise generated
by a facially unqualified contract. Divergence theorists hold that the promise
58 . Id . (emphasis added).
59 . Id . (emphasis added).
60 . See id . at 1635 (“Expectation damages can be justified as the law’s best guess about
the remedial moral duty that most promisors would prefer.”).
61 . See Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 51, at 27 (“Whereas these issues are
framed . . . as concerning the law’s choice of contract remedies, they in fact concern the parties’
choice of contract terms” and thus that “the assessment of the expectation remedy [does not]
turn on substantive economic or moral arguments [but rather] on how best to interpret party
intent.”).
62 . See Klass, supra note 35, at 147 (“If Markovits and Schwartz’s moral argument is to
succeed, the dual-performance hypothesis must be an empirical interpretive claim. . . .
[S]ophisticated parties must in fact understand their contracts to commit them not to perform
the action term simpliciter, but to perform the action or the transfer term. . . . Markovits and
Schwartz do not explain why parties choose to express their contracts using language that does
not correspond to their understanding of the commitment.”); Shiffrin,Must I Mean What You
Think I Should Have Said?, supra note 42, at 171–72 (“[W]hy not think that the better inter-
pretative strategy is to look at what people actually said . . . rather than at what the model sug-
gests they should have said?”).
63 . SeeMarkovits & Schwartz, supra note 5; Shavell, supra note 1.
64. Barbara H. Fried, The Holmesian Bad Man Flubs His Entrance, 45 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 627, 629–30 (2012).
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is, like the face of the contract, unqualified. Correspondence theorists hold
that the promise is, like their interpretation of the contract, a promise in the
alternative—either with respect to the primary obligation to perform or to
the secondary obligation regarding the moral remedy for breach. Moral be-
lief about the scope of the promise arising from a facially unqualified con-
tract will govern that party’s breaching behavior, to the extent a party is mo-
tivated by their moral beliefs. Differing moral beliefs about breach among
different types of parties accordingly leads to differing breaching behavior by
those parties.
Recent empirical and theoretical research sheds important light on actu-
al contracting parties’ moral beliefs about the permissibility of breach. The
empirical research has focused on individuals’ moral attitudes and demon-
strated that most individuals view breach of contract as morally wrong. The
research further demonstrates that those attitudes and the resulting propen-
sity to breach are sensitive to a range of contextual variables. A core implica-
tion of the empirical research is that individuals appear to judge the scope of
the moral obligation under a contract on the basis of the express terms of
that contract. The research regarding the moral attitudes and breaching be-
havior of commercially sophisticated parties, by contrast, rests largely on
theoretical considerations. In particular, scholars argue that contracting par-
ties who satisfy certain “domain assumptions” regarding their “rationality”
and other features will breach and pay damages rather than perform when
the breach would be efficient. Although it remains an open empirical ques-
tion which and how many contracting parties satisfy those domain assump-
tions, it seems plausible that many commercial parties will.
A. Individual Moralist Performers
The empirical evidence “suggests that people have a preference for keep-
ing promises per se.”65 But questions remain regarding how that preference
manifests in the context of contracts. Do individuals perceive a contract to
give rise to a promise, the violation of which is morally wrong? And if so, is
that promise one simply to perform or merely to perform or to pay? Steven
Shavell reported the first empirical study on individual attitudes toward
breach of contract.66 He presented subjects with several scenarios detailing a
particular breach of contract. After each scenario, subjects categorized the
breaching party’s behavior as “(1) definitely unethical; (2) somewhat unethi-
cal; (3) neither ethical nor unethical; (4) somewhat ethical; [or] (5) definitely
ethical.”67 One scenario presents a breach in which the cost of performance
rose substantially and the description of the scenario did not mention that
the breaching party would pay damages to his counterparty. The average of
the subjects’ score of the breaching party’s conduct was 2.41, which lies be-
65. Vanberg, supra note 1, at 1468.
66. Shavell, supra note 1.
67 . Id . at 453.
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tween “somewhat unethical” and “neither ethical nor unethical.”68 Only 7.3%
of subjects scored the conduct as “somewhat ethical,” and none scored it as
“definitely ethical.”69 Over 92% thus scored the breach as either unethical to
some degree or ethically neutral. Shavell accordingly concluded that in most
individuals’ view, “the breach of a contract is seen as what it appears to be: a
violation of a promise and thus having a morally inappropriate aspect.”70
Shavell’s remaining scenarios added factual context to this original sce-
nario in order to test that context’s effect on the subjects’ attitudes about the
breach. One such scenario stated that the breacher would pay compensatory
damages as required by contract law. Subjects on average scored this breach
3.56, between ethically neutral and somewhat ethical.71 The key implication
is the significant increase in individuals’ perception of the morality of breach
when they are expressly informed of the payment of damages as a conse-
quence of nonperformance.
Subsequent studies confirm and elaborate on Shavell’s initial results.
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan and David Hoffman’s studies confirmed Shavell’s
principal finding. They concluded that “ordinary people think that breach is
morally wrong and believe that contract damages should reflect the ethical
culpability of the breaching party.”72 When subjects were permitted to pick
any amount as the appropriate measure of damages in a typical breach of
contract case, they assigned the proper measure of damages for breach to be
2.19 times the expectation interest.73 Even with that supercompensatory
award, subjects still rated breach as over 5 on a scale from 1 (“not immoral”)
to 7 (“extremely immoral”).74 Three-quarters reported that the breacher
ought to perform rather than pay damages in ordinary contracts, and two-
thirds believed that a court ought to enforce specific performance.75 Wil-
kinson-Ryan and Hoffman subsequently recreated these core results.76 These
experiments thus “demonstrate that most people believe that a contract is a
promise to perform as agreed.”77
Further studies show that individuals are significantly more likely to
breach, and significantly less likely to view breach as immoral, if the contract
68 . Id .
69 . See id .
70 . Id .
71 . Id . at 455.
72. Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1004.
73 . SeeWilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 1, at 420–21.
74 . Id . at 417–20.
75 . Id . at 420.
76 . See, e .g ., Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1022–31.
77 . Id . at 1015. Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoffman also demonstrate several framing effects,
under which subjects’ moral responses vary according to the factual context of a breach. For
example, they found that subjects viewed breach to gain as a greater moral wrong than breach
to avoid loss and that subjects viewed intentional breach as a greater moral wrong than unin-
tentional harms. Id .
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explicitly contemplates breach and specifies its remedy. Frameworks that
make incentive structures explicit lead individuals to navigate those incen-
tives through more self-interested behavior than they would with identical
but implicit incentive structures.78 In an experimental setting, game players
are less likely to behave altruistically and more likely to act self-interestedly
when the game permitted their counterparty to punish that noncooperative
behavior.79 Such sanctions may shift individuals from viewing noncoopera-
tive behavior as morally prohibited to viewing it as permitted and priced. In
a classic experiment, researchers observed that parents with children in day-
care were paradoxically more likely to pick their child up late when the facili-
ty imposed an explicit fine compared to when the facility had a policy of dis-
couraging, but not fining, late pickups.80 Wilkinson-Ryan hypothesizes that
liquidated-damages clauses function like those “small sanctions” by “making
the sanction for breach explicit within a contract.”81 Individuals “who saw a
contract with a liquidated-damages clause were more willing to breach” than
individuals who saw an otherwise-identical contract without such a clause.82
Subjects reported that they would breach a contract without a liquidated-
damages clause only if offered a premium of between 75% and 100% over
their liability in damages.83 In other words, subjects said they would breach
only if doing so gained them close to double what they would have to pay in
the expectation remedy. By contrast, subjects reported that they would
breach a contract with a liquidated-damages clause for a smaller premium of
between 25% and 50% over their liability in expectation damages.84 Subjects’
willingness to breach a contract with a liquidated-damages clause remained
even if the damages clause functioned as a penalty clause by awarding their
counterparty damages greater than the harm they suffered.85 Subjects’
breaching behavior responded to the presence of a liquidated-damages
clause because they believed breaching such a contract was less wrongful and
immoral, and less harmful to the breacher’s reputation, than breaching a
contract without a remedial clause.86
The empirical work thus supports three conclusions. First, individuals
tend to view breach of contract as morally wrong. Second, although most in-
dividuals believe breach is immoral, there remains heterogeneity in individ-
uals’ moral beliefs because a substantial minority appears to take a
78 . See Samuel Bowles, Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May Undermine
“The Moral Sentiments”: Evidence from Economic Experiments, 320 SCIENCE 1605, 1608 (2008).
79 . See, e .g ., Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on Hu-
man Altruism, 422 NATURE 137, 138 (2003).
80 . See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7 (2000).
81. Wilkinson-Ryan, Liquidated Damages, supra note 1, at 636, 652.
82 . Id . at 659.
83 . Id .
84 . Id .
85 . Id . at 660–61.
86 . Id . at 663–64.
March 2019] Moral Diversity and Efficient Breach 903
Holmesian view of breach. Third, individuals tend to define the scope of the
moral obligation generated by a contract on the basis of the express terms of
the contract. They perceive a facially unqualified contract as generating a
promise to perform, rather than an option to perform or to pay. By contrast,
the presence of a remedial clause like a liquidated-damages clause increases
some subjects’ willingness to breach in part because those subjects interpret-
ed the clause to put their counterparty on notice that breach was possible. In
this respect, some subjects may have understood the liquidated-damages
clause to alter the substantive content of the promise so that nonperfor-
mance was no longer a violation of a moral obligation. Most individuals thus
reject the convergence theorists’ view that facially unqualified contracts gen-
erate only a promise in the alternative.
B. Sophisticated Holmesian Breachers
Scholars largely agree that “sophisticated” commercial actors, like large
companies, breach contracts in accord with the Holmesian view.87 Those
parties understand their contracts, even if facially unqualified, to implicitly
include the option to decline to perform and to pay expectation damages in-
stead. Accordingly, when faced with the possibility of efficiently breaching, a
sophisticated commercial party will breach. Markovits and Schwartz observe
that a “firm is more likely to exhibit behavior consistent with the maximiza-
tion of monetary returns than an individual responding to a question-
naire.”88 That consensus comports with common sense. Commercial actors
aim to create wealth within the confines of the law. Corporations and other
business organizations are designed with that aim in mind, and the law im-
poses duties on corporate officers to seek to maximize profits.89 It then
87 . See, e .g ., Kraus, supra note 4, at 1638 (“While the promisor’s payment in lieu of per-
formance is legally denominated ‘breach’ and payment of ‘damages,’ the efficient breach hy-
pothesis supposes that many parties—and most commercially sophisticated parties—will in-
tend and understand the promisor to be discharging his moral obligation by compensating the
promisee, rather than paying damages for breach of a moral obligation.”); Markovits &
Schwartz, supra note 5; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 5, at 550.
88. Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1955 n.32.
89 . See, e .g ., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); see also Leo E.
Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and
Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 761, 768 (2015) (“[D]irectors must make stockholder welfare their sole end,
and . . . other interests may be taken into consideration only as a means of promoting stock-
holder welfare.”); Stephen Bainbridge, Opinion, A Duty to Shareholder Value, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
16, 2015, 6:46 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/16/what-are-
corporations-obligations-to-shareholders/a-duty-to-shareholder-value (on file with the Michi-
gan Law Review). But see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014)
(“While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit corporations is to make money,
modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense
of everything else, and many do not do so.”); LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUEMYTH:
HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC
(2012).
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stands to reason that commercial actors would approach the decision of
whether to breach a contract with the same cold calculus. That decision may
account for secondary consequences of breaching, like reputational harms,
that complicate the calculus beyond the immediate benefits of breaching bal-
anced with liability for expectation damages. But those secondary effects re-
fine rather than displace commercial actors’ decision to further their eco-
nomic interest. It seems reasonable to suppose, then, that while individuals
are more often moralist performers, sophisticated commercial actors are
more often Holmesian breachers.
The empirical evidence supporting that view, however, is sparse. Several
empirical studies indicate that, at least in certain industries, commercial ac-
tors tend not to breach even if it is in their immediate economic interest to
do so.90 Those nonbreaching commercial parties may simply be accounting
for reputational effects, which may be particularly powerful in commercial
contexts in which markets are dominated by repeat players. There is also ev-
idence that some decisionmakers for commercial actors take ethical consid-
erations into account in deciding whether to breach. But the existing empiri-
cal studies have focused on particular markets that may be peculiarly
sensitive to reputational effects. Moreover, certain industries like the dia-
mond trade may be dominated by individual rather than organizational de-
cisionmaking and may therefore reflect individuals’ moral views to a greater
extent than they represent a common view among commercial actors. As a
result, the existing empirical data may reflect exceptions to a Holmesian
commercial consensus. Although that interpretation of the data is plausible,
it remains speculative.
Scholars instead base their view that commercial actors are usually
Holmesian on theoretical considerations. Markovits and Schwartz limit their
dual-performance hypothesis to “sophisticated and rational” parties that
“make the contractual choices that maximize their expected profits.”91 These
“domain assumptions” force them to concede that “the conclusions they im-
ply hold only in the domain they accurately describe.”92 Accordingly, “real
parties would make the contract that ‘model parties’ make only if, and to the
extent that, real parties resemble the model parties and the other model as-
sumptions hold.”93 Although they “claim that the set of real parties that re-
semble model parties is not trivial,”94 they elaborate no further basis for that
90 . See, e .g ., David Baumer & Patricia Marschall, Willful Breach of Contract for the Sale
of Goods: Can the Bane of Business Be an Economic Bonanza?, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 159, 171–72
(1992) (empirical data indicates that members of the business community disapprove of delib-
erate breach even when efficient).
91. Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 53, at 1093.
92 . Id . at 1094.
93 . Id .
94 . Id .
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empirical claim.95 In earlier work, Schwartz and Robert Scott offered some
considerations in support of the “traditional[] assum[ption] that firms at-
tempt to maximize expected profits.”96 They note that the reasons for doubt-
ing that a legal actor is self-interested apply to individuals more readily than
to firms because a “firm is directed by its owners, who often are sharehold-
ers” and “[s]hareholders prefer their firms to maximize profits.”97 As a result,
“[f]irms . . . will choose to maximize profits unless the managers who run
them cannot be controlled by the shareholders who own them.”98 And alt-
hough a firm’s managers may exploit its shareholders by diverting its wealth
to themselves, they are unlikely to do so by failing to breach a contract when
it would be in the firm’s interest to breach.99 Moreover, according to
Schwartz and Scott, firms are less likely to fall victim to the cognitive errors
that behavioral economics has revealed plague individuals because the com-
petitive marketplace disciplines underperforming firms and firms are struc-
tured to engage in group rather than individual decisionmaking.100 They
therefore conclude that although not “all firms all the time pursue profit-
maximizing . . . owners and the market put systematic pressure on firms to
behave optimally; hence, it is a plausible working assumption that firms ra-
tionally pursue the objective of maximizing profits.”101
Thus, there are persuasive theoretical considerations supporting the
conclusion that sophisticated commercial actors, especially firms, breach as
Holmesians. But robust empirical evidence supporting that claim remains
wanting. It appears beyond doubt that at least some commercial actors are
Holmesians, and it seems likely that a greater portion of commercial actors
than individuals are Holmesians. Nonetheless, to the extent empirical doubt
endures regarding which and how many commercial parties are Holmesian,
the existence of the asymmetry in moral belief and breaching behavior be-
tween individuals and commercial actors remains probable but uncertain.
95. Klass, supra note 35, at 147 (“One wants some empirical evidence for Markovits and
Schwartz’s empirical interpretive claim. . . . [A]nalytic truths about economic models [are not]
interpretations of what people in the world outside those models intend or say.”).
96. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 5, at 550.
97 . Id .
98 . Id . at 550–51.
99. Schwartz and Scott do not consider the possibility of contracts between a firm and
its managers, but such contracts are independently regulated by corporate law to prevent inap-
propriate self-dealing. Because corporations and their officers are thus incentivized to refrain
from abusing such transactions, Schwartz and Scott may argue that firms will avoid such
abuse.
100 . Id . at 551–52 n.18.
101 . Id . at 551.
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III. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THEASYMMETRY INMORAL BELIEF
ABOUT BREACH
The asymmetry in moral belief and breaching behavior implicates im-
portant normative concerns, particularly that individuals and sophisticated
commercial parties view the moral matter differently. The normative con-
cerns extend beyond those arising simply from the fact that some parties
breach their contracts. If breaching a contract is morally wrong because it
involves breaking a promise, then sophisticated commercial parties’ perva-
sive practice of breaching is a pervasive moral wrong. But that moral wrong
does not depend on which parties breach and which do not. Moreover, this
Article’s analysis does not presuppose an answer to the ultimate philosophi-
cal question of whether breach is immoral—on that, it remains agnostic.
This Article thus approaches the diversity of moral belief differently than
scholars who view certain attitudes as “heuristic errors that the law should
reject or try to overcome.”102 Nor does it assume that “lay judgments about
[contract] ought to be endorsed and embodied in the law.”103 The analysis
diagnoses the normative problems that flow solely from the fact of moral
disagreement and identifies ways the legal system can adapt to the presence
of the asymmetry.
This Part analyzes those implications using two normative frameworks:
first, economic efficiency; and second, fairness and distribution. These nor-
mative frameworks correspond to the approaches adopted by many of the
participants in the debate about orthodox contract doctrine’s remedies. The
first, economic efficiency, appeals to scholars like Shavell, Markovits,
Schwartz, and others who support various aspects of orthodox contract doc-
trine on the ground that those aspects tend to lead to Pareto-optimal distri-
butions and maximize aggregate social welfare. The second, fairness and dis-
tribution, appeals to scholars for whom nonconsequentialist moral
considerations trump efficiency. Because both normative frameworks con-
demn the asymmetry, scholars should condemn the asymmetry as well, re-
gardless of their view on the underlying philosophical question on the mo-
rality of breach.
A. Economic Efficiency
The initial economic implications of the asymmetry in moral belief
about breach are straightforward: individual moralists forgo efficient breach-
es that would be Pareto optimal and that would increase overall social wel-
fare. Consider the example in which a seller promised to plow snow from a
buyer’s driveway for $10. Suppose the seller’s time and labor are worth $8 to
102. Richard Craswell, When Is a Willful Breach “Willful”? The Link Between Definitions
and Damages, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1501, 1506 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be
clear, Craswell does not endorse that view but rather recognizes it as a possible approach to
divergent lay opinions about intentional breach of contract. Id .
103 . Id .
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him, so the benefit on his side of the bargain is $2. Suppose further that the
buyer valued the service at $15, and thus her expectation damages in the
event of breach would be $5 ($15 less the $10 price of plowing). If the prom-
issor’s car breaks down and emergency repairs would cost him $100,104 then
he fails to achieve a Pareto-optimal outcome and thus fails to maximize ag-
gregate social welfare by performing his promise and paying for the emer-
gency repairs out of a sense of moral obligation.105 If he performed, the buyer
would realize her surplus of $5, the net of her $15 valuation of the plowing
less the $10 price. But the seller would realize a loss of $98—the $10 payment
for plowing less the $100 cost of repairs and the $8 value of his time and la-
bor. The aggregate social welfare relative to the ex ante baseline is thus nega-
tive $93. By contrast, if the seller had breached: the buyer would still realize
her $5 surplus through expectation damages, and the seller would avoid net
loss of $98 and instead lose only $5 through his damages liability.106 Thus,
breaching results in no change from the ex ante baseline compared with per-
forming, which results in a steep loss of $93. For all parties, then, promise-
breaking pays.
Accounting for the welfare effects of the moral sentiments may alter
these results, but only at the margins. The economic calculations in this
snow-plowing example have not yet accounted for the frustration and per-
haps even moral outrage the buyer may experience upon breach. She may
feel frustration from the visceral disappointment of not receiving the per-
formance on which she had counted. She may separately feel moral outrage
at the fact that she was the victim of a broken promise. The seller, for his
part, may feel guilty about breaking his promise and disappointing his buy-
er.107 All these moral sentiments count in the calculus of social welfare, and
104. Assume emergency repairs are much more expensive than ordinary repairs but are
necessary to perform the service in time to be useful.
105. Put in terms of Pareto optimality, both the seller and the buyer would prefer a legal
rule that permitted the seller to pay rather than perform in this contingency. The seller would
prefer a legal rule permitting him to pay because doing so would allow him to avoid the high
cost of repairs. The buyer would also prefer that legal rule because a legal rule that required
performance would raise the purchase price to account for the seller’s potential increased cost
if his car breaks down. Because the buyer’s surplus is much less than the potential cost of
emergency repairs, that increased purchase price would not be worth it to the buyer.
106. Accounting for the surplus captured by the person who repairs the car will not alter
these results in cases in which breaching will maximize truly aggregate—as opposed to merely
bilateral—social welfare. Suppose that the car repairman would realize a $10 surplus by selling
his emergency repair services for $100. The promisor’s breach would then result in aggregate
social welfare of only negative $83 relative to the ex ante baseline, which is better than the neg-
ative $93 calculated by excluding his surplus but still far worse than the breaching outcome of
$0 relative to the ex ante baseline.
107. Some may argue that if the seller opts to perform his promise rather than breach,
then this choice demonstrates that his welfare must have been higher by performing rather
than breaching due to the effects of the moral sentiments. See generally KAPLOW & SHAVELL,
supra note 32. If this were true, then individuals’ moral aversion to breach would maximize at
least their own welfare. Because expectation damages should, in theory, compensate a disap-
pointed promisee enough to put him in the same position he would have been with perfor-
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their inclusion makes breach less advantageous than it would have been in
their absence. In some cases, that difference may be dispositive by rendering
breach more harmful than performance. If, in our example, the feelings of
moral outrage and guilt were so intense that they amounted to the equivalent
of negative $100, then performing would maximize aggregate social welfare
by avoiding the negative moral sentiments. But in most cases, the moral sen-
timents will not be so intense that their inclusion in the calculus of social
welfare would make a difference in whether breach is ultimately efficient. As
a result, consideration of the moral sentiments means at most that somewhat
fewer cases present genuine opportunities for efficient breach than it may
appear if we failed to account for those sentiments.
But a moral aversion to breach may actually enhance efficiency by pre-
venting opportunistic breaches. A breach is opportunistic “when one party
attempts to reap ‘the benefit of the bargain without bearing the agreed-upon
cost.’ ”108 In other words, an opportunistic breacher attempts to breach for
his own gain even though that breach will reduce aggregate social welfare.
To accomplish this, he must “exploit[] the inadequacies of purely compensa-
tory remedies.”109 To illustrate an opportunistic breach, adjust the parame-
ters of the snow-plowing example so the emergency repairs cost only $3.
Performing rather than breaching would then maximize aggregate social
welfare because the seller’s net loss from performing remain lower than the
buyer’s surplus. Performing would cost the seller $8 in his time and labor
mance, it would follow that individuals’ decisions not to breach would be Pareto optimal and
maximize aggregate social welfare after all.
This argument rests on the view, often called psychological egoism, that individuals are al-
ways most motivated to pursue what they perceive to maximize their welfare. This view is thus
descriptive regarding the motivations of actual people, as opposed to normative egoism, which
holds that people ought to pursue their self-interest. The psychological egoist account accord-
ingly rejects, apparently on a priori grounds, the possibility of genuinely morally motivated or
altruistic conduct. Moral philosophers have largely rejected this view of moral psychology. See,
e .g ., 1 JOSEPH BUTLER, FIFTEEN SERMONS PREACHED AT THE ROLLS CHAPEL (London, W. Bo-
tham 1726); Joel Feinberg, Psychological Egoism, in REASON & RESPONSIBILITY 501, 501–12
(Joel Feinberg ed., 3d ed. 1975); THOMASNAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OFALTRUISM 84–87 (1970).
Nor is there convincing empirical evidence supporting the claim that individuals are typically
psychological egoists. See Stephen Stich et al., Altruism, in THE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
HANDBOOK 147, 200–01 (John M. Doris et al. eds., 2010).
Moreover, even if individuals are psychological egoists, some approaches to the regulation
of contracts that facilitate breach will nonetheless increase welfare relative to the status quo
baseline. Consider, by way of analogy, a psychological egoist who believes she must sacrifice a
leg in order to do what is right. If her feelings of guilt resulting from doing wrong are suffi-
ciently great, she maximizes her welfare by sacrificing her leg. But it would be better still if she
did not have to choose between her leg and her morals. Similarly, if a legal regime induces in-
dividual moralists to believe they may breach a contract without acting immorally, that legal
regime increases welfare relative to the status quo under which those individuals face the
choice between breaching while suffering the guilt of acting wrongly and keeping their con-
tracts and losing the advantages of efficient breach. See infra Section IV.B.
108. Klass, supra note 32, at 371 (quoting Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d
742, 751 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.)).
109. Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.).
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plus $3 in emergency repairs and would yield a payment of $10, resulting in
a net loss of $1. The buyer’s surplus from performance remains $5, thus
yielding aggregate social welfare of $4 relative to the ex ante baseline.
Breaching, by contrast, would result in the seller paying $5 in expectation
damages with no other costs and the buyer receiving that $5, thus yielding
aggregate social welfare of $0 relative to the ex ante baseline. Performance
thus remains the efficient outcome. But if the seller recognizes that “only a
lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30,”110 much less $5, he may breach safe in the
knowledge that the buyer will never sue him to recover her expectation in-
terest. That breach is inefficient because it results in lower aggregate social
welfare—$0 relative to the ex ante baseline rather than the $4 surplus relative
to the ex ante baseline that performance would yield. But the seller may
breach anyway because breaching is better for him if he does not have to pay
expectation damages.
The prospect of opportunistic breach by individual moralists reduces the
economic inefficiency created by the asymmetry in moral belief. Because op-
portunistic breaches reduce aggregate social welfare, economic theory rec-
ommends discouraging or even prohibiting them. Posner thus concludes
that “[i]f a promisor breaks his promise merely to take advantage of the vul-
nerability of the promisee . . . we might as well throw the book at [him].”111
Legal scholars have therefore supported supracompensatory damages for in-
efficient, opportunistic breaches on economic grounds.112 Individuals’ moral
belief that breach is wrong prevents them from breaching opportunistically.
That moral belief may even counsel against opportunistic breach more
strongly than other types of breach. For example, opportunistic breaches are
typically avoidable, whereas efficient breaches may be driven by practical or
absolute necessity.113 The asymmetry may thus accomplish through internal
moral motivation what doctrine struggles to induce through economic in-
centives: the socially optimal level of opportunistic breaches, zero.
Nonetheless, the possibility of opportunistic breach does not defeat the
conclusion that the asymmetry in moral belief is problematic on grounds of
economic efficiency for several reasons. First, even accounting for the social
costs of opportunistic breaches forgone because of individuals’ moral beliefs,
the asymmetry creates net economic inefficiency so long as those costs are
smaller than the potential benefits associated with forgone efficient breaches.
110. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.).
111. POSNER, supra note 32, at 105.
112 . See Craswell, supra note 102; William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in
Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629, 654–62 (1999); Nicholas J. Johnson, The Boundaries of Extra-
compensatory Relief for Abusive Breach of Contract, 33 CONN. L. REV. 181, 187–88 (2000).
113. In our snow-plowing example, the moralist may excuse the seller from his promise
of performance if the cost to him becomes sufficiently high. The greater the burden on the
promisor, the more likely morality is to excuse breaking the promise. But the greater the bur-
den on the promisor, the more likely it is that his net loss outweighs the promisee’s surplus
from performance. For that reason, morality is more likely to excuse efficient breaches than
opportunistic breaches.
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And there is reason to believe that benefits of forgone efficient breaches
outweigh their costs. For example, refusing to breach mortgage contracts
likely cost underwater homeowners billions of dollars. The same moral im-
pulse not to breach a contract may also lock individuals into rental-housing,
employment, and consumer contracts that individuals could breach effi-
ciently. The costs of individual moralists engaging in opportunistic breaches
may, by contrast, be relatively modest. Many consumer contracts are drafted
to authorize the commercial party to impose fees like late fees, cancellation
fees, and other surcharges that serve both to deter breach and to ensure ade-
quate compensation for the commercial party if the consumer does breach.
That automatic transfer in the event of breach substantially reduces the
availability of opportunistic breaches to individual moralists.
Moreover, there is no reason to think that the costs of opportunistic
breach would be especially high or that the benefits of efficient breach would
be peculiarly lacking for individual moralists as opposed to commercially
sophisticated breachers. As a result, if the costs of opportunistic breach out-
weigh the benefits of efficient breaches for individual breachers, then the
same likely holds for commercially sophisticated breachers. If so, then the
asymmetry would still be problematic. But in that case, instead of individu-
als’ puritanical moral beliefs about contract inefficiently preventing breach-
es, the problem would be sophisticated commercial parties’ libertine moral
beliefs about contract permitting too many opportunistic breaches.
Second, doctrinal reforms may independently solve the problem of op-
portunistic breaches. For example, imposing punitive damages for oppor-
tunistic breach may both penalize those breaches and provide sufficient in-
centive to bring suit. In our snow-plowing example, suppose a court would
impose punitive damages of $1000 if the seller breached opportunistically.
That damages award may be sufficient for the buyer to sue, and the resulting
liability would render breaching no longer in the seller’s interest. Moreover,
the mere threat of that liability may discipline the seller from opportunisti-
cally breaching by altering his incentives. This doctrinal solution faces chal-
lenges, particularly practical obstacles to courts determining when a breach
was opportunistic and thus warrants punitive damages.114 Nonetheless, puni-
tive damages would attack the problem globally by deterring opportunistic
breaching by any party, not just the individual parties whose moral beliefs
may now dissuade them from such breaches.115 Once opportunistic breaches
are adequately deterred using other doctrinal tools, the economic inefficien-
cy of the asymmetry in moral belief remains to be addressed.
114 . See Craswell, supra note 102, at 1509.
115. Crafting doctrine to prevent opportunistic breaches only by individuals and not
those by sophisticated commercial parties would also raise nonefficiency distributional con-
cerns. This Article addresses distributional issues in the next Section.
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B. Fairness and Distribution
The asymmetry in moral belief about breach also raises serious fairness
and distributional concerns. Those concerns arise both vertically and hori-
zontally. That is, they arise both in the context of contracts between individ-
ual moralist performers and sophisticated Holmesian breachers and in the
context of contracts among individual moralists. Consider a vertical contract
between an individual moralist and a commercially sophisticated Holmesian:
the counterparties’ asymmetric moral beliefs lead them to view the same fa-
cially unqualified contract differently. The individual moralist will view her-
self as morally bound to perform, while the sophisticated Holmesian will
view the contract as offering an option not to perform if breaching is advan-
tageous. The sophisticated Holmesian’s decision to breach does not directly
harm the individual moralist—by hypothesis, the breacher will pay expecta-
tion damages that put the individual in as good a position as she would have
been in had the Holmesian performed. But by breaching when it is advanta-
geous, the Holmesian exercises an option to increase its wealth. The individ-
ual moralist, by contrast, does not exercise a corresponding option to in-
crease her wealth by breaching. The aggregate result of those divergent
responses is that sophisticated Holmesians increase their wealth while indi-
vidual moralists do not.
A simple model of a contract between an individual moralist and a so-
phisticated Holmesian illustrates the potential for unfair and distributionally
problematic results. Suppose the seller in the snow-plowing scenario is a
Holmesian breacher business, and thus it will breach its contracts whenever
it is efficient to do so. We can further assume that the seller breaches effi-
ciently but not opportunistically and will pay its liability for expectation
damages willingly and without litigation.116 Suppose further that the buyer is
an individual moralist, and so she will not willingly breach her contracts in
any circumstances. If the Holmesian seller’s car breaks and emergency re-
pairs would cost $100, the seller will breach. By breaching, the Holmesian
seller has improved its welfare (via avoiding a loss) by $93. The same result
holds if the Holmesian seller breaches to take a better opportunity rather
than to avoid an unexpected cost. Suppose that a new buyer offers the
Holmesian seller $30 to plow his driveway, and the seller has time to plow
only one of the two driveways. The Holmesian seller would breach its con-
tract with the original buyer, pay expectation damages to the original buyer
for a loss of $5, and plow the new buyer’s driveway for a total gain of $17
($30 less the $5 in expectation damages and the $8 value of his time and la-
bor). By breaching, the Holmesian seller is thus $15 better off than it would
have been had it performed its original contract. In either case, the
Holmesian seller has increased its welfare by breaching.
116. That assumption is, of course, unrealistic. But the model demonstrates that even if
the Holmesian breacher is ideal in this respect, the asymmetry generates unfair distributions
due to the parties’ divergent approaches to breach. Adjusting the model to include a more real-
istic Holmesian who will not pay damages unless sued would exacerbate the effect.
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By contrast, the individual moralist buyer will not breach her contract
either to avoid a loss or to seize a new opportunity for gain. Suppose the
buyer does not have the money on hand to pay the seller for its plowing ser-
vices. She feels a moral obligation not to breach, and therefore she secures a
high-interest payday loan to cover the $10 cost of the plowing. She must re-
pay the $10 principal plus $10 in interest next month. Her total cost to avoid
breaching the contract is thus $20, in exchange for which she gets a benefit
of plowing that is worth $15 to her. The decision not to breach thus results
in a $5 loss to her welfare. If she had breached, however, she would have
owed only $2 in expectation damages to the seller. As a result, her morally
motivated decision to perform lowered her wealth by $3. The same result
holds if we alter the example so she foregoes a breach that would permit her
to take advantage of an opportunity rather than to avoid a loss. For example,
suppose she could have instead spent the $10 on a ticket to a surprise per-
formance of her favorite musician. She cannot afford both to buy the ticket
and to pay for the plowing she previously contracted to buy. Although she
valued the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to see her favorite musician at
$500, she forgoes that substantial surplus because she believes that breach is
morally wrong.
Individual moralists’ aversion to breach generates further distributional
inequalities in the context of contracts among individuals. This effect is illus-
trated by contrasting two types of “horizontal” contracts; that is, contracts
between two parties of the same moral type—individual-to-individual and
firm-to-firm. Imagine two snow-plowing contracts: one between an individ-
ual moralist seller and an individual moralist buyer, say a handyman and a
homeowner contracting for the plowing of the homeowner’s driveway; and
another between a Holmesian seller and a Holmesian buyer, say a snow-
plowing firm and a large chain restaurant contracting for the plowing of the
restaurant’s parking lot. Because the handyman and the homeowner are in-
dividual moralists, neither will breach even if it were efficient to do so. Thus,
the handyman will incur the high cost of emergency repairs to his car in or-
der to keep his promise to plow the driveway, and the homeowner will re-
main in the contract even if she no longer needs her driveway plowed or if
she could devote the money owed to a more beneficial use like buying once-
in-a-lifetime concert tickets. Individual moralists as a class thus forgo advan-
tageous opportunities to breach their contracts with other individual moral-
ists, and as a class their wealth is accordingly less than it would be if their
moral beliefs did not render them averse to breach.117
By contrast, the Holmesian snow-plowing firm and the Holmesian chain
restaurant will breach whenever it is efficient for either to do so. For exam-
ple, the Holmesian snow-plowing firm will breach rather than pay for the
high cost of emergency repairs to its equipment. Similarly, the Holmesian
117. Recall that breaching would, by hypothesis, not reduce the welfare of the breaching
party’s counterparty because expectation damages would fully compensate the counterparty
for the lost welfare due to nonperformance.
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chain restaurant will breach rather than keep the contract if the restaurant
will be closed anyway because of a shortage of food supplies. Commercially
sophisticated Holmesian breachers will breach their contracts with other
parties, including contracts with other Holmesian breachers, whenever it is
in their interest to do so. As a result, sophisticated Holmesian breachers are
economically better off as a class than they otherwise would have been. The
aggregate effect of that divergent breaching behavior with respect to hori-
zontal contracts is that sophisticated Holmesian breachers get richer by
breaching their horizontal contracts, whereas individual moralists do not,
thus increasing the overall distributional inequality between Holmesian
breachers and individual moralists.
These stylized examples demonstrate the potential distributional impact
of the asymmetry in moral belief about breach: the sophisticated Holmesians
get richer by breaching while the individual moralists do not. The distribu-
tional impact compounds as these asymmetric breaches repeat over time and
among many Holmesian breachers and individual moralists. In aggregate,
these divergent breaching tendencies may generate substantial inequalities in
wealth between the class of sophisticated Holmesian breachers and the class
of individual moralists. Because the class of sophisticated Holmesian breach-
ers consists of firms and other commercial parties, that dynamic magnifies
preexisting distributional inequalities. The asymmetry in moral belief thus
leads to a regressive change in the distribution of resources.
The distributional effect of the asymmetry would be illusory, however, if
firms priced individual moralists’ aversion to breach into their contracts.118
Because individual moralists interpret a facially unqualified contract to re-
quire them to perform, their counterparties can be confident that they will
receive performance. That assurance is valuable. As a result, in a competitive
marketplace firms will pay more (or charge less) for contracts with an indi-
vidual moralist. Consider the market for cell phone service. Providers tradi-
tionally charge less for a multiyear contract than they charge for a month-to-
month contract. That decrease in price reflects the competition among firms
for customers who agree to purchase many months of service. Now consider
two competing firms: Firm A believes its customers will breach the multiyear
contract whenever it is efficient for the customer to do so, and Firm B cor-
rectly believes its customers will tend to refrain from breaching on moral
grounds.119 Firm B therefore believes the average number of months that
customers will remain in a contract is higher than the number Firm A be-
lieves. Because firms can profitably offer service at a lower per-month price
the more months a customer will remain in a contract, Firm B believes it can
profitably offer a lower per-month price than Firm A. Because customers
demand cell phone contracts with lower per-month prices, Firm B captures
118 . See Richard Craswell, Passing On the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution
in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991).
119. The example in the text does not account for express cancellation fees, a common
feature in multiyear consumer contracts. See, e .g ., infra note 140 and accompanying text.
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an increasing share of the market. And because Firm B’s customers in fact
tend to refrain from breaching on moral grounds, Firm B remains profitable.
Competition, in turn, drives all firms to match Firm B’s lower per-month
price. The actual market for cell phone service exhibits this dynamic: provid-
ers pay close attention to their “churn” rate, which is the rate at which cus-
tomers discontinue service.120 Many factors affect a customer’s propensity to
discontinue their cell phone contract, including the availability of better al-
ternatives and behavioral irrationality. But a moral aversion to breach would
be evident if implicit in that rate, and so the market for cell phone service
prices individual moralists’ belief into the cost of the contract.
Although competition may produce a lower price that will mitigate the
pernicious distributional effects of the asymmetry in moral belief, it is un-
likely to eliminate it, especially in markets in which it may have the greatest
impact on individuals. Market failures may often impede competition to
price in the moral aversion to breach. To price that aversion, firms must first
know how frequently an individual will be faced with the possibility of
breaching efficiently (or opportunistically) and how probable it is that an in-
dividual will actually breach. Firms likely lack knowledge on both questions.
In many markets, individuals’ opportunities for advantageous breach arise
irregularly. In this regard, the market for cell phone service may be an outli-
er. Consider, for example, the mortgage market. Firms failed to price in sub-
prime borrowers’ propensity to default.121 Part of the reason for that failure
is that the market conditions that prompted the wave of defaults was un-
precedented, so firms lacked a historical basis to determine how many bor-
rowers would be forced to default.122 Similarly, firms lacked a historical basis
to estimate how many borrowers would decline an opportunity to default
advantageously, for moral or other reasons.
Firms likely face similar challenges in other markets. Businesses may
have little basis to guess how frequently a customer will be presented with a
better way to spend her money that requires her to breach her consumer
contract, or how frequently an employee will be presented with an unex-
pected professional opportunity that requires her to breach her employment
contract. Nor will they have adequate knowledge to estimate how frequently
the moral aversion to breach will prevent people from breaching in those
circumstances. The empirical evidence demonstrates that the magnitude of
the moral aversion to breach is sensitive to the factual context of the con-
tract. For example, the resecuritization of a mortgage loan makes people less
likely to believe it is morally wrong to breach the mortgage contract.123 But a
firm may lack experience with the particular factual context of its contracts
120 . See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
121 . See Bar-Gill, supra note 10, at 1080–81 n.13.
122 . See Jennifer E. Bethel et al., Legal and Economic Issues in Litigation Arising from the
2007–2008 Credit Crisis, in PRUDENT LENDING RESTORED: SECURITIZATION AFTER THE
MORTGAGEMELTDOWN 163, 185 (Yasuyuki Fuchita et al. eds., 2009).
123 . SeeWilkinson-Ryan, Breaching, supra note 1, at 1580–81.
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to know the strength of individuals’ moral aversion to breaching their con-
tracts. In the absence of knowledge either about the regularity of individuals’
opportunities for advantageous breach or the magnitude of their moral aver-
sion to doing so, firms are unable to price their counterparties’ moral beliefs
into their contracts. The pricing mechanism may thus fail to eliminate the
asymmetry’s distributional effect between individuals and commercial par-
ties.
Moreover, even if the pricing mechanism were successful in eliminating
the distributional effect between the class of individual moralists and the
class of commercial Holmesian breachers, it would exacerbate the distribu-
tional effects among individuals with varying moral beliefs. Although indi-
viduals tend to believe that breach of contract is morally wrong, not all indi-
viduals hold that belief.124 As a result, although most people will refrain from
breaching when it is in their interest to do so, some will breach. In the ab-
sence of the pricing mechanism, this heterogeneity would introduce a distri-
butional inequality between individuals who believe breach is morally wrong
and those who do not. Just like sophisticated commercial actors, individuals
with Holmesian moral beliefs would get richer by breaching.
Thus, the introduction of the pricing mechanism actually makes that in-
equality worse rather than better. Firms will reduce prices based on their es-
timate of how frequently their individual counterparties will breach. Because
firms likely lack the ability to distinguish between individual moralists and
individual Holmesians, they will reduce prices for all customers based on an
average rate of breach. As a result, firms will distribute the savings they reap
from individual moralists’ aversion to breach across all their individual
counterparties. Individual Holmesians will thus pay a lower price than they
would have in the absence of the pricing mechanism, but they will continue
to breach when it is in their interest to do so. Individual moralists, mean-
while, bear the entire cost of their moral aversion to breach (through their
forgone advantageous breaches) but will reap only some of the gains through
a price reduction. The distributional effect among individuals is particularly
problematic because it is plausible to suppose that wealthier and better edu-
cated individuals are more likely to view contracts in commercial,
Holmesian terms. Thus, the pricing mechanism compounds the regressive
effect of the asymmetry in moral belief in such a way that rich Holmesian
individuals get richer.125 As a result, the pricing mechanism is at best an in-
complete resolution of the distributional problems attributable to the asym-
metry in moral belief about breach.
124 . See supra Section II.A.
125 . Cf . Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Uncon-
scionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1266–68 (2003); Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Regu-
latory Techniques in Consumer Protection: A Critique of European Consumer Contract Law, 50
COMMON MKT. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 109, 115 (2013) (“The poor, the elderly, the less edu-
cated—those for whom the protections are enacted in the first place—lack the information,
sophistication, and the resources. And yet, they bear an equal share of the cost.”).
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IV. ACCOUNTING FOR THEASYMMETRY INCONTRACT LAW
The law of contracts should account for the asymmetry in moral beliefs
about breach. It is unlikely that the phenomenon of moral diversity will dis-
sipate, and so long as it endures, the existing legal framework will lead to
economically inefficient outcomes and unfair distributions. No prior re-
search has addressed ways that the law can adapt to the existence of the
asymmetry in moral belief.126 This Article surveys the possibilities. The tradi-
tional tools of contract law are judicial doctrines applied ex post in the event
of litigation, particularly the crafting of remedies for breach. But ex post ju-
dicial intervention is unlikely to solve the problems posed by the asymmetry
in moral belief and may introduce greater harms than it alleviates. Ex ante
regulation of contracts holds greater promise. Although disclosure require-
ments, the mainstay of proposals for the regulation of contracts, may have
little impact, direct regulation of the substantive terms of contracts may be
effective. Requiring contracts to contain an express provision stating an op-
tion not to perform and to pay instead may align the individual moralists’
and sophisticated Holmesians’ perception of the moral obligation under the
contract, thus eliminating the effects of the asymmetry in moral belief.
A. The Limits of Ex Post Judicial Intervention
1. Adjusting the Damages Measure
One way to attack the problems resulting from the asymmetry in moral
belief about breach is to adjust doctrine to encourage individual moralists to
breach more often. The pernicious effects of the asymmetry arise only be-
cause the asymmetry in moral belief in turn causes an asymmetry in breach-
126. Rebecca Stone has addressed a related but critically different phenomenon. In two
recent articles, Stone has offered an economic analysis of law accounting for “internalizers.”
Rebecca Stone, Economic Analysis of Contract Law from the Internal Point of View, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 2005 (2016) [Stone, Economic Analysis of Contract Law from the Internal Point
of View]; Rebecca Stone, Legal Design for the “Good Man,” 102 VA. L. REV. 1767 (2016). The
asymmetry in moral belief about the permissibility of breach is critically different from a par-
ty’s motivation to comply with the law as such. Internalizers are “agents who adopt legal rules
as reasons for action even when their self-interest (and other things they care about) dictates
doing otherwise.” Stone, Economic Analysis of Contract Law from the Internal Point of View,
supra at 2008. Stone recognizes that whether an internalizer will be motivated to perform ra-
ther than pay expectation damages depends on the prior interpretive question of what the pri-
mary legal norm of contract law requires. Id . at 2028–29. She further recognizes that internal-
izers may view that norm as requiring performance or may view it “disjunctively” to require
either performance or payment. Id . at 2028–31. Ultimately, she adopts the view that internaliz-
ers will view their legal obligations disjunctively. Id . at 2030 (“Although none of these consid-
erations is decisive on its own, together they lend support to a perform-or-pay interpretation
of a promisor’s duties.”). Her analysis accordingly does not address the question at the center
of this Article: how the law should respond to the existence of those who—contrary to Stone’s
internalizers—believe themselves morally bound to perform. This Article and Stone’s work are
thus complementary, by addressing the ways the law of contract can and should adapt to the
presence of legal actors who diverge from the Holmesian “bad man” in different ways.
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ing behavior. If the law could induce individual moralists to breach like so-
phisticated Holmesians, then the problem might be solved.
This approach is unlikely to be effective and would probably introduce
greater problems of its own. Individual moralists are unresponsive to the
economic incentives provided by expectation damages: it is already in their
economic interest to breach efficiently, but their moral beliefs block them
from doing so. Wilkinson-Ryan’s research indicates that some individual
moralists may be willing to breach but only for a large premium.127 To adjust
doctrine to take advantage of that moral flexibility would require providing
individual moralists with a greater economic incentive to breach. The law
cannot affect the breacher’s prelegal incentive structure—it cannot make the
snow plower’s emergency repairs less expensive, and it cannot make the
buyer’s alternative opportunity to see a concert more beneficial. Instead, the
law can improve the breacher’s incentives only by decreasing the individual
moralist’s liability for damages.
That doctrinal adjustment would often be ineffective because some indi-
vidual moralists may refuse to breach at any price. Even for those individual
moralists who would breach if offered enough money, reducing their liability
for breach to zero may not be enough. Wilkinson-Ryan’s studies suggest that
individuals would breach a facially unqualified contract only if offered ap-
proximately double their liability in expectation damages.128 At that thresh-
old, their net liability would be the equivalent of a benefit equal to their ex-
pectation damages. Reducing their damages liability to zero would then
prompt individuals to breach efficiently, when and only when their benefit
from breaching is greater than their counterparty’s lost surplus. If the indi-
vidual moralist requires a premium any higher than that, even reducing their
damages liability to zero would provide insufficient incentive for them to
breach.
In any event, reducing damages liability would be unfair, inefficient, and
morally suspect. It would be unfair because it would necessarily require that
individuals’ counterparties be undercompensated. Although sophisticated
Holmesians as a class benefit economically from the asymmetry in moral be-
lief, that does not mean that any given Holmesian has benefited. As a result,
undercompensatory damages cannot be justified on redistributivist grounds.
Reducing damages would also be inefficient because it would induce some
parties to breach too often. If the reduced damages measure applied univer-
sally, then sophisticated parties would breach opportunistically whenever it
was in their interest because they would never have to pay damages. Even if
the reduced damages measure applied only to individuals rather than to
firms as well, courts lack the tools to distinguish between individuals who
hold moralist views and those who do not. As a result, courts could not tar-
get the availability of the reduced-expectation remedy only to moralists. That
inability creates the further perverse consequence that those marginal indi-
127. Wilkinson-Ryan, Liquidated Damages, supra note 1, at 659.
128 . Id .
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viduals who are induced to breach are those whose moral views can be
trumped by economic incentives, while those who stick to their moral guns
continue to refuse to breach. The law should be wary of rewarding that mor-
al flexibility. Finally, even those individuals who decide to breach because of
their reduced damages liability would do so against their moral beliefs.
Crafting contract law to cause people to act in ways they deem immoral in-
troduces further problems. In addition to the negative welfare effects of neg-
ative moral sentiments like guilt, this approach would exacerbate the con-
cerns of scholars like Shiffrin that the law should not make it more difficult
for people to act virtuously.
2. Adopting Specific Performance
The other ex post approach is to adopt specific performance as the rem-
edy for breach. Instead of attempting to induce individual moralists to be-
have as sophisticated Holmesians, this approach attempts to require sophis-
ticated Holmesians to perform as moralists. Courts could either impose
specific performance as a mandatory rule or set it as a default rule. Neither
response is a warranted solution to the problems created by the asymmetry
in moral belief.
Imposing specific performance as a mandatory rule may partially ame-
liorate the asymmetry, but it would do so at an unacceptably high price. Spe-
cific performance would aim to eliminate the consequences of the asym-
metry by forcing all parties to perform, aligning sophisticated Holmesians’
behavior with that of individual moralists. But this would be unlikely to
make more than a modest impact on the problem. Individuals bring relative-
ly few cases to force performance, often because of the costs of litigation rela-
tive to the reward in damages.129 Because expectation damages are calibrated
to be the monetary equivalent of performance, adopting specific perfor-
mance as the remedy for breach provides no greater incentive to sue. More-
over, many individuals already falsely believe that contract doctrine requires
performance in the case of breach,130 so changing the law to conform to that
false belief would not lead those individuals to sue. Nor is the change in rem-
edy likely to change significantly sophisticated Holmesians’ breaching be-
havior by changing their incentives. Specific performance as a remedy could
discipline parties into refraining from breach only insofar as those parties
believed a court would ultimately order them to perform. If a potential
breacher thought that likely, then it would choose to perform in order to
avoid the costs of litigation. But that disciplining mechanism works only to
129. What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litiga-
tion for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim? See, e .g ., AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 365 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc.,
376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million
individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”).
130. Matthew A. Seligman, The Error Theory of Contract, 78 MD. L. REV. 147, 166–77
(2019).
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the extent that potential breachers fear suit, and sophisticated Holmesians
can reasonably assume that the threat of litigation is low because of the prac-
tical impediments to suit.
Even to the extent that adopting specific performance as a mandatory
rule would be effective, it would be so only by forcing inefficient perfor-
mance or requiring costly and often impractical renegotiation. There are few
corresponding gains to offset those costs. In a case where the threat of specif-
ic performance induces a potential breacher to perform, its counterparty will
be better off only if that counterparty would not have received expectation
damages under the current regime. But a potential breacher would only rare-
ly be disciplined into performing by the threat of specific performance but
not by the threat of expectation damages. Performance may, of course, be far
costlier to the breacher than expectation damages. But for that threatened
remedy to adjust the potential breacher’s behavior, there must be a sufficient
likelihood that its counterparty will sue. And, as discussed above, in a wide
range of contexts litigation is unlikely. Finally, to the extent that sophisticat-
ed Holmesians are indeed disciplined into performing, that change in behav-
ior would lead to higher costs to individuals because firms will increase pric-
es to account for the increased costs from compelled performance. The cost
of eliminating the asymmetry would thus be borne by the individual moral-
ists who are already disadvantaged by their moral views.
Specific performance as a default rule, by contrast, may exacerbate ra-
ther than eliminate the pernicious consequences of the asymmetry in moral
belief. To the extent that parties retain specific performance as the remedy
for breach rather than expressly adopt a different remedy, the same negative
consequences follow as with adopting specific performance as a mandatory
rule. But sophisticated Holmesians would likely draft around the default
rule. It is always in the sophisticated Holmesian’s interest to avoid perfor-
mance because expectation damages are always cheaper in those cases in
which a Holmesian would opt to breach. After all, if performance were
cheaper than payment then the Holmesian would not have any reason to
breach in the first place. Many contracts between sophisticated Holmesians
and individual moralists, such as consumer contracts, are adhesion contracts
drafted by the sophisticated party. The result would be the doctrinal status
quo recreated in the express (but likely opaque) provisions of the contract.
At the same time, unsophisticated parties would be unlikely or unable to
draft around the default rule when it was in their interest to do so. Accord-
ingly, adopting specific performance as a default rule would do little to ad-
dress the asymmetry.
B. The Limits of Ex Ante Disclosure Requirements
Disclosure requirements on contracts between sophisticated Holmesians
and individual moralists show only modest promise as a response to the
asymmetry in moral belief. Disclosure requirements aim to adjust individu-
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als’ behavior without restricting freedom of choice.131 Scholars have pro-
posed disclosure requirements as responses to consumers’ imperfect ration-
ality132 because well-designed disclosures can lead consumers to make better
decisions in contracting. For example, the Truth in Lending Act requires
lenders to disclose the annual percentage rate (or APR) for certain credit
products. There is some evidence that this requirement increases consumers’
attention to the costs of credit contracts and thereby enhances competition,
which results in lower rates.133 Regulators rely on disclosures to achieve these
same results in a wide variety of other markets as well.
A disclosure requirement may be slightly effective in prompting more
individual moralists to breach efficiently. The disclosure could inform indi-
viduals that the law provides for compensation in the event of breach. In that
respect, it would operate similarly to existing disclosures, like the APR dis-
closure, that aim to inform consumers of a contract’s true cost. Those exist-
ing disclosures, however, aim to influence consumers’ behavior by facilitat-
ing better self-interested reasoning. For example, the APR disclosure helps
consumers to comparison shop between lenders to find the lowest-cost,
highest-benefit loan.
A disclosure that breach will result in expectation damages, by contrast,
could help individual moralists engage in better moral reasoning. The disclo-
sure would not seek to convince individuals to become Holmesians and be-
lieve that breach is morally permissible. Such direct moral persuasion is un-
likely to be successful; there are few models of successful attempts by the
government to change the moral views of its citizenry by direct advocacy.
Rather, the disclosure could highlight an empirical fact—the existence of
compensatory damages—that may change individuals’ moral conclusions
about breach. Shavell’s data illustrates the potential for such a disclosure. Re-
call that subjects rated breach as “midway between somewhat unethical and
neither ethical nor unethical” in a scenario that did not mention that the
nonbreaching party would receive compensatory damages.134 By contrast,
they rated breach as ethically neutral to somewhat ethical when the presenta-
tion of the scenario expressly informed them that the breacher would com-
pensate the nonbreaching party “as contract law says is required.”135 Accord-
ingly, disclosing the fact of compensatory damages could change individuals’
moral deliberations and thereby induce more of them to breach efficiently.
131 . See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the
Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard
H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003).
132 . See, e .g ., Bar-Gill, supra note 10.
133 . Id . at 1142. Bar-Gill also explains the limitations of the APR disclosure in the sub-
prime mortgage market and offers proposals to increase its efficacy. Id . at 1143–50.
134. The average score for this scenario was 2.41 on a scale from 1 (“definitely unethi-
cal”) to 5 (“definitely ethical”). Shavell, supra note 1, at 453.
135 . Id . at 454–55.
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But there are significant limitations to the disclosure approach to solving
the asymmetry in moral belief about breach. Disclosure requirements in
general are only somewhat successful in overcoming the information and
rationality deficits at which they are traditionally targeted.136 This is due, in
no small part, to the fact that many people don’t read legally required disclo-
sures.137 In addition to the shortcomings of disclosure requirements in gen-
eral, a disclosure requirement aimed at inducing individual moralists to
breach efficiently faces further limitations. Shavell’s data, for example, indi-
cates only that subjects informed of the availability of compensatory damag-
es on average rated a breach as somewhat ethical. One plausible reason why,
suggested by Wilkinson-Ryan,138 is that compensation solves only part of the
moral problem people see with breach—a broken promise paid for with rep-
arations is still a broken promise.
It thus appears likely that a significant number of individuals will con-
tinue to view breach as morally wrong even after they are informed of the
availability of expectation damages. Some people may view breach as morally
wrong only because they falsely believe that the victim would go uncompen-
sated, which they reasonably view as unfair. For those people, disclosing the
availability of compensation would provide them with accurate information
about the law so they would conclude that, by their preexisting moral
framework, breach is not immoral after all. But others—indeed, plausibly
most people—view breach as immoral for the simple reason that it involves
breaking a promise, and even compensation is inadequate to make breach
moral. For these people, disclosing the availability of damages would not
change the moral status of breach in their eyes. Thus, a disclosure require-
ment would likely leave a substantial number of individual moralists un-
moved.
C. The Promise of Mandatory Exit Clauses
1. Exit Clauses as Promises-in-the-Alternative
These traditional strategies fail because they do not address the underly-
ing issue: varying moral belief about breach. Increasing a damages award at
best simply induces people to breach notwithstanding their moral beliefs.
That approach has predictable collateral damage: even if people who are
morally averse to breach are properly incentivized, people (or firms) with
different (or no) moral beliefs will be over-incentivized to breach. Similarly,
adopting specific performance leaves the asymmetry in moral belief intact
but reverses its practical implications, forcing Holmesians to perform even
when it would be inefficient for them to do so. Disclosure requirements
136 . See, e .g ., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW: THE FAILURE OFMANDATEDDISCLOSURE (2014).
137 . Id . at 10–11.
138. Wilkinson-Ryan, Liquidated Damages, supra note 1, at 663–64.
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won’t alter the behavior of those who believe breach is wrong simply because
it means breaking a promise, which probably includes most individual mor-
alists.139 At best, disclosure might assuage those who think breach is wrong
only because they don’t realize the other party will be compensated.
The better strategy is to attack the source of the problem: to change the
underlying moral facts so that an individual’s moral beliefs align with firms’
breaching behavior, thereby eliminating the asymmetry at its roots. Individ-
ual moralists who are unreceptive to the financial incentives offered by ad-
justing the damages remedy and to the effect of disclosure requirements will
breach efficiently only if they believe that doing so abides by the promise
they made when they entered the contract. To induce those individuals to
breach efficiently, the law would have to align their perception of the con-
tractual promise to Holmesians’ perception of the contractual obligation.
The best way to accomplish such an alignment is a legal requirement
that contracts include an express exit clause. A mandatory exit clause will
induce a shift in moral perception by reframing the choice of whether to per-
form or pay. An exit clause is an express contractual term granting a right to
exit the contract and pay the monetary equivalent of damages. That contrac-
tual term can be phrased as a “right” or “option” to “cancel,” “exit,” or “ter-
minate” the contract. The critical feature of an exit option is that it frames
the decision to pay instead of perform as consistent with the contractual ob-
ligation rather than as breaking it. For example, a cell phone contract might
include the following exit clause:
The subscriber has a right to cancel this service contract at any time prior
to the end date of the service contract. If the subscriber exercises that right
under this contract, the subscriber will pay the provider a cancellation fee
of $250.140
An express exit clause is similar to, but critically different from, a liqui-
dated-damages clause. A liquidated-damages clause specifies in the contract
itself a party’s monetary liability if it breaches. For example, a liquidated-
damages clause in a cell phone contract might state:
139 . See Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 1, at 412–20 (presenting results of empiri-
cal studies indicating most people find breach of contract morally objectionable).
140. This exit clause is modeled after Verizon’s standard cellphone service contract
agreement, which includes the following term: “If your line of service has a contract term and
you cancel that line, or if we cancel it for good cause, during that contract term, you’ll have to
pay an early termination fee.” See My Verizon Wireless Customer Agreement, VERIZON,
https://www.verizonwireless.com/legal/notices/customer-agreement/
[https://perma.cc/5NPM-Q69G]. The contract then specifies the amount of the “early termina-
tion fee,” which begins at $350 and decreases each month of the “contract term.” Id . Scholars
have noted the “high churn rates in the cell phone market.” Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca Stone,
Mobile Misperceptions, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 68 (2009) (reporting churn rates “between
13% and 31% a year in 2007”). High churn rates—that is, the percentage of subscribers who
cancel their service before the expiration of the contract—may indicate that subscribers view
paying an “early termination fee” as absolving them of a moral obligation to stay in the service
contract.
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If the subscriber breaches this contract by terminating it during the con-
tract term, the subscriber will pay the provider compensation of $250.
An exit clause is thus structurally similar to a liquidated-damages clause be-
cause both specify how much money must change hands if a party chooses
not to continue in the contract.141 But the critical difference is that the exit
clause, unlike the liquidated-damages clause, does not portray payment as a
form of breach.
The requirement that contracts include an express exit clause is proba-
bly best implemented through statute or regulation, rather than by a court-
created rule. A court-created rule, perhaps limiting the enforceability of con-
tracts to those that include an exit clause, could in principle incentivize firms
to include such clauses. But because so few consumer contract breach cases
are litigated, firms’ incentives to abide by an ex post judicial rule would be
substantially weakened. The problem would be amplified because consumers
would have little way of knowing that they even had a contractual right being
violated, because of the violation stems from the absence of a term in the
contract.
An ex ante regulatory requirement is the more straightforward ap-
proach. There is precedent for similar regulatory requirements. Perhaps the
most well-known ex ante regulations of contracts are disclosure require-
ments. State and federal law, both by statute and by agency regulation, im-
pose disclosure requirements on a wide variety of contracts. For example, the
APR disclosure requirement in the Truth in Lending Act requires that the
interest term be prominently presented to the borrower.142 Such disclosure
requirements do not regulate the substance of the contract’s terms and in
that respect differ from a mandatory exit clause. But the Truth in Lending
Act also includes a requirement that very closely mirrors the sort of manda-
tory exit clause under consideration here. Section 1635 of the Act creates a
“right to rescind” certain home equity loans within three days of their con-
summation or the delivery of the Act’s required disclosures, whichever is lat-
er.143 Federal Reserve Board regulations require that lenders provide notice
141. In practice, consumer contracts may include clauses that are phrased somewhere on
a continuum between a pure liquidated-damages clause and a pure exit clause. Other consum-
er contracts may reference “minimum term agreements” without making clear what, if any,
fees or liquidated damages would be due upon terminating the contract. See, e .g ., Comcast
Agreement for Residential Services, XFINITY, https://www.xfinity.com/corporate/
customers/policies/subscriberagreement [https://perma.cc/5K3K-KPSV] (stating “you may
terminate this Agreement for any reason at any time” “[u]nless your Service(s) are subject to a
minimum term agreement” without addressing terms of early cancellation for such services).
That contracting reality illustrates the complexity of the moral framing of contracts. This Arti-
cle’s discussion focuses on the “pure” examples at either end of the continuum because they
isolate individuals’ moral reactions to those benchmarks.
142 . See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren,Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 87
& n.282 (2008).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2012) (“[T]he obligor shall have the right to rescind the transac-
tion until midnight of the third business day following the consummation of the transaction or
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to borrowers of this right to rescind and forms by which borrowers can exer-
cise this right.144 Section 1635 is limited: it applies only to home equity
loans145 and not to purchase-money loans,146 and the right to rescind can be
exercised only within three days of the lender delivering the Act’s required
disclosures about the terms of the mortgage.147 Despite these limitations, the
effect of the statutory right to rescind—combined with an express disclosure
stating that right to rescind in the loan documentation—approximates a reg-
ulatory intervention requiring the right to rescind as an express term of the
contract.
The mortgage market illustrates how the proposed regulatory require-
ment might work. The regulator—either Congress by statute or the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau by regulation—could require purchase-
money mortgages to include an express term creating a right to exit the
mortgage contract, subject to the remedies already available to the lender
under the law. That term might state:
You have a right to cancel this mortgage at any time. If you exercise this
right, you will be required to pay the lender back the balance of the loan. If
you cannot afford to pay back the balance of the loan, state law may require
you to turn over the property as you would in a foreclosure.148
Exiting the mortgage contract would no longer constitute breach; in-
stead, the contract’s express terms provide an option to exit, equivalent to
what otherwise would constitute breach.149 As a result, the borrower would
never perceive a moral obligation to continue to “perform”—that is, to con-
tinue to make his or her monthly payments—rather than to exercise the con-
tractual option to exit the contract and turn over the house. Accordingly, in
contrast to homeowners’ behavior in the aftermath of the housing crisis,
the delivery of the [disclosures required by the Act], whichever is later, by notifying the credi-
tor, in accordance with regulations of the [Federal Reserve Board], of his intention to do so.”).
144. Right of Rescission, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)–(b) (2018) (Regulation Z of the Federal
Reserve Board); see Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 790 (2015) (holding
borrowers exercise the right to rescind by “notifying” the lender and need not file a lawsuit);
Frank A. Hirsch Jr. & Richard A. McAvoy, Life After Jesinoski: The New ‘Wild West’ of TILA
Rescission, CONSUMER FIN. SERVS. L. REP., Feb. 13, 2015, at 4; Milan Prodanovic, Hiding in
Plain Sight: Jesinoski and the Consumer’s Right of Rescission, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y SIDEBAR 141 (2015). This Article’s author was among the counsel representing the peti-
tioners in Jesinoski.
145. That is, loans for which borrowers offer a house they already own as collateral to
secure funds they can use for home improvements or other purposes.
146. That is, loans with which the borrower uses the proceeds of the loan to purchase the
home that subsequently serves as collateral.
147. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a).
148. Because of the gravity of the financial decision to exit a mortgage, the prudent regu-
lator might also include a recommendation that the borrower consult a lawyer or mortgage
counselor before deciding whether to exercise the right to exit.
149. In the case of mortgages, the remedy provided for by the contract and the back-
ground law is foreclosure of the home serving as collateral for the loan rather than payment of
expectation damages. That complication does not affect the broader point.
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many more borrowers might exit mortgage contracts when it is in their eco-
nomic interest to do so.150
The strategy of mandating an exit clause draws on two well-developed
concepts: information-forcing rules and choice architecture. An infor-
mation-forcing default rule is “any contract default rule that favors one party
in order to induce the other party to a transaction to disclose particular in-
formation.”151 Such rules aim to solve information asymmetries by setting
the default to whichever legal rule the better-informed party tends not to
prefer, which can be overridden only by revealing the relevant information.
So, for example, in the classic contracts case Hadley v . Baxendale, the plain-
tiff knew that a delay in delivery of a critical replacement part would leave its
mill shut down and thus cause extensive harm.152 But the court limited re-
covery to foreseeable harm unless the plaintiff had put the defendant on no-
tice of the atypical risk of extensive harm.153 Thus we have a default rule lim-
iting recovery to expectation rather than actual damages. But this is merely a
default—parties can get around it by communicating the value of perfor-
mance to their counterparty, which in turn promotes efficient contracting.154
J.H. Verkerke recently extended the concept of information-forcing defaults
to argue that some “clause-forcing” rules, which incentivize the more sophis-
ticated party to draft a contract to include a particular term, can serve a simi-
lar function when the less-sophisticated party is ignorant of the applicable
legal rule.155 For example, the UCC imposes an implied warranty of mer-
chantability, which a seller can override only with a clear statement disclaim-
er.156 The contract term disclaiming the warranty itself shares information
150 . SeeWhite, supra note 16.
151. J.H. Verkerke, Legal Ignorance and Information-Forcing Rules, 56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 899, 910 (2015). Information-forcing default rules are a type of “penalty default.” See Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989). The other type, a negotiation-forcing default rule, selects a
default rule that neither party prefers in order to induce the parties to negotiate. Verkerke, su-
pra at 911.
152. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 146–47; 9 Ex. 341, 343–44.
153 . Id . at 151–52 (limiting recover to harms either “reasonably . . . considered . . . [as]
arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things” from the breach, or might “rea-
sonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made
the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it”).
154 . See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 151, at 95–107.
155. Verkerke, supra note 151, at 903 (clause-forcing rules “encourage[] sophisticated
parties to provide legal information to the comparatively poorly informed individuals with
whom they do business”).
156 . See U.C.C. § 2-314 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012) (imposing implied
warranty of merchantability as a default term “if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods
of that kind”); id . § 2-315 (“Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s
skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under
the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.”); id . § 2-
316(3)(a) (“[A]ll implied warranties are excluded by expressions like ‘as is’, ‘with all faults’ or
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about the applicable legal rule with the less sophisticated party. If the default
rule did not require the warranty, then sophisticated parties would remain
silent in their contracts and less sophisticated parties would remain ignorant
of their legal rights.
A mandatory exit clause is superior to a traditional information-forcing
default rule in this context. A mandatory rule, just like a default rule, can
serve the same information-forcing function by requiring contracts to in-
clude the term communicating information. But a default rule in favor of
specific performance has drawbacks that a mandatory exit clause does not.
An information-forcing default rule of specific performance would require
contract drafters either to accept that remedy or, more likely, to include a
contract term setting damages as the remedy for breach. That ultimate out-
come appears similar to that of a rule mandating an exit clause, but a manda-
tory exit clause is a better solution for two reasons. First, contract drafters
could override a default rule of specific performance with an express clause
simply setting damages as a remedy for breach. But such a term would not
reframe the choice for an individual moralist because it still portrays depar-
ture from the contract as a form of breach. Second, a mandatory exit clause
is superior to a specific performance default rule on traditional majoritarian
grounds.157 Setting the default to a rule that few if any parties prefer imposes
unnecessary (if modest) transaction costs in contracting and, if parties fail to
insert the remedy clause (either due to high transaction costs or inadvert-
ence), could result in parties trapped in a contract inefficiently governed by
specific performance.158
A mandatory exit clause thus shares an information-forcing function
with Verkerke’s clause-forcing rules by communicating a legal rule—that the
individual can leave the contract and pay instead—to the less sophisticated
party through the text of the contract, but the mandatory clause is superior
to a traditional information-forcing default rule of specific performance. Yet
a mandatory exit clause does more than just convey the applicable legal rule
in the way a liquidated-damages clause does. An exit clause reframes the
choice of whether to pay rather than stay in the contract in a way that can
influence individual moralists’ decisions beyond just telling them a legal fact
that they don’t already know. Such reframing is an exercise in choice archi-
tecture.159 As Cass Sunstein explains, “When people make decisions, they do
so against a background consisting of choice architecture.”160 Choice archi-
tecture involves, among other things, the way options are presented to the
other language which in common understanding calls the buyer’s attention to the exclusion of
warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty . . . .”).
157 . See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,Majoritarian vs . Minoritarian Defaults, 51
STAN. L. REV. 1591 (1999).
158 . See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 608, 614–15 (1998).
159 . See RICHARDH. THALER&CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 81–100 (2008); Christine Jolls
& Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 200–03 (2006).
160. Cass R. Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 413, 417 (2015).
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person making the choice. Accordingly, a choice architect “has the responsi-
bility for organizing the context in which people make decisions.”161 For ex-
ample, the design of a grocery store, including the placement of healthy ver-
sus unhealthy options, affects what food people choose to purchase. By
placing healthy foods on shelves at eye level and unhealthy food on shelves
near the floor, the designer of the grocery store can influence people to buy
more healthy food than they would if the shelf placements were reversed.
The same food options are available, but the way they are presented affects
how likely people are to choose them.
Mandating an exit clause, like other exercises in choice architecture, pre-
serves precisely the same legal options available under a facially unqualified
contract. The background law permitted breach and payment of damages
under the latter, and the express terms of the contract permit the same under
the former. Accordingly, under a contract with an exit clause, an individual
can still choose either to perform the primary obligation under the contract
or to pay. Neither option is more difficult or expensive to select than it was
under the facially unqualified contract. Performance is precisely as costly
under a contract with an exit clause as it was under the facially unqualified
contract, and nonperformance is, if anything, less burdensome because the
exercise of an express contractual option to exit would not require burden-
some litigation or settlement negotiations. Nonetheless, individual moralists
may be more likely to exercise the express option not to perform162 than they
would be to breach a facially unqualified contract because of the difference
in framing of the various options.163 Thus the requirement to include an ex-
press exit clause can influence individuals’ decision whether to perform or to
pay without removing their ultimate freedom to make that choice.
But a mandatory exit clause does not merely reframe the moral choice: it
changes the moral facts on the ground, at least in the eyes of the individual
moralist. It presents the choice of whether to pay or stay in a way that alters
the moral status of that option by elevating what was a background legal op-
tion—breach and pay damages—into an explicit contractual option. It thus
differs importantly from traditional interventions in choice architecture,
which typically aim to address the cognitive shortcomings of bounded ra-
tionality—such as judgment errors like optimism bias stemming from cogni-
tive heuristics and biases that lead people to draw erroneous conclusions on
which they then base their choices.164 By contrast, an express exit term seeks
to address not a cognitive bias but the variance in substantive moral view.
Because individual moralists judge the substantive scope of their contractual
161. THALER& SUNSTEIN, supra note 159, at 3.
162. By “perform,” I mean perform the primary obligation under the original facially un-
qualified contract—for example, to plow a driveway. Under a contract with an express exit op-
tion, declining to “perform” the original primary obligation would qualify as performance ra-
ther than as breach. SeeMarkovits & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1947–48.
163. See infra Section IV.C.2 for a discussion of the efficacy of mandatory exit clauses.
164 . See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 159.
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promise by the express terms of the contract, an express contract-in-the-
alternative generates a promise-in-the-alternative. As a result, a contractual
term creating an express right to exit and pay a fee changes individual moral-
ists’ perception of their substantive moral obligations under the contract.
Thus, although the express term does not change the legal landscape on
which individuals choose whether to breach—thereby differing from tradi-
tional information-forcing clauses—it does change the moral landscape, at
least according to the individual moralists. This intervention can be thought
of as a kind of moral choice architecture,165 in which the intervention chang-
es the substantive moral status of an individual’s options in a way that frees
him to act in a way that is practically and economically equivalent to con-
duct he believes is morally prohibited.
Reframing the moral choice by mandating an exit clause can resolve the
consequences of the asymmetry in moral diversity about breach. The under-
lying economic incentives to breach remain unchanged by including an exit
clause with a corresponding exit fee set at the right level. A contract with an
exit clause, a contract with a liquidated-damages clause, and a contract with
neither clause are all economically identical if the exit fee and liquidated-
damages amount are set to the amount a court would award in expectation
damages for breach.166 Under any of the three contracts, a party can either
(a) perform the primary obligation under the contract or (b) pay its counter-
party an amount of money that is, by hypothesis, the same in each case.
But these three economically identical contracts yield different moral
framings. A facially unqualified contract, with neither an exit clause nor a
liquidated-damages clause, presents paying rather than staying in the con-
tract as breach of the contract and therefore a breach of the promise. A con-
tract with a liquidated-damages clause makes explicit the financial conse-
165. The “moral choice architecture” discussed in the text differs critically from the “be-
havioral ethics” discussed in management literature. Behavioral ethics aims to understand how
individuals decide whether to act in accord with generally accepted moral norms, and to iden-
tify the extent to which bounded rationality may influence people to act immorally. See Linda
Treviño et al., Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review, 32 J. MGMT. 951 (2006). For ex-
ample, because of loss aversion individuals may be more prone to lie or cheat to avoid a loss
than to secure a gain. See Gilles Grolleau et al., Cheating and Loss Aversion: Do People Cheat
More to Avoid a Loss?, 62 MGMT. SCI. 3428 (2016). Although framing the outcomes variously
as a gain or a loss affects people’s tendency to lie, no one—including the individuals whose
propensity to lie is affected by that framing—thinks it is more morally acceptable to lie to avoid
a loss rather than to secure a gain. By contrast, moral choice architecture involves changing the
substantive moral status of an option by altering its framing. At least by the lights of individual
moralists, it is morally forbidden to breach a facially unqualified contract, but it is morally
permissible to “breach” a functionally (if not morally) equivalent contract-in-the-alternative.
166. This equivalence requires several further assumptions: that there are no transaction
costs like litigation and that parties are able to anticipate the amount of expectation damages a
court would award. Note that the former assumption—a lack of transaction costs like litiga-
tion—makes a facially unqualified contract more appealing to a breaching party than it would
be in reality. Litigation costs would reduce the net recovery under a facially unqualified con-
tract, and so relaxing the assumption of no transaction costs would allow the exit fee to be set
lower than the gross amount of expectation damages to maintain economic equivalence.
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quences of breach, but it does not purport to change the fact that nonper-
formance of the primary obligation in the contract constitutes breach. And
so, in the opinion of the individual moralist, the liquidated-damages clause
does not change the moral scope of the contractual promise.167 An exit
clause, by contrast, converts a facially unqualified contract into an express
contract-in-the-alternative. As a result, declining to perform the primary ob-
ligation under the contract and instead paying a set exit fee no longer counts
as (and will not be perceived by individual moralists as) breach. With an exit
clause, paying constitutes (and will be perceived by individual moralists as)
an alternative way of performing the contract. Exercising the right or option
to exit the contract and paying the fee thus satisfies the promise individual
moralists believe they made when they entered the contract. When the exit
fee is set to the amount of expectation damages, the individual moralist will
then exercise the contractual right to exit when, and only when, doing so is
efficient. That change in moral framing thus aligns the moral perspectives of
individual moralists and Holmesian firms. Both will breach, or exit, the con-
tract when doing so is efficient.168
Of course, an exit clause, like a disclosure, can affect a party’s beliefs and
behavior only if the party reads it.169 The presence of an exit clause does not
reframe the decision to leave a contract if the party contemplating breach (or
exit) doesn’t know the term is in the contract. That fact could limit the effec-
tiveness of a mandatory exit term requirement, but there are reasons for op-
timism. First, consumer common knowledge tends to incorporate ubiqui-
tous features of contracts, whether those features are legally required or not.
For example, most consumers know that cell phone contracts include terms
that permit early termination of the service in exchange for a fee.170 This sort
of common knowledge can rapidly incorporate changes in industry-standard
contracts. Airlines began charging fees for checked bags and extra leg room
only recently, but those fees are already widely known among consumers.
Second, individuals are particularly likely to be aware of their contractual
rights in the sorts of contracts for which the decision of whether to breach is
most consequential. The mortgage context again serves as a telling example.
Mortgage contracts are among the most lengthy and complicated contracts
that people encounter, and homeowners (sometimes with the assistance of
credit counselors or lawyers) are often aware of their legal right to rescind a
167. Though, as Wilkinson-Ryan suggested, people’s moral aversion to breach may be
lessened when presented with a contract with a liquidated-damages clause because its presence
puts the nonbreaching party on notice of the prospect of breach. See Wilkinson-Ryan, Liqui-
dated Damages, supra note 1, at 636.
168. The presence of an exit clause may also deter opportunistic breaches by individuals
by spelling out the consequences of nonperformance, thereby making it easier for a firm to
secure compensation.
169 . See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 136, at 10–11 (noting limitations of
mandatory disclosure requirements).
170 . See supra note 140.
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mortgage precisely because of the magnitude of its stakes.171 And third, even
if an exit clause yields only limited improvement with respect to the problem
of the asymmetry in moral belief, the presence of an exit clause is unlikely to
create any new problems. An exit clause, calibrated to include a fee equiva-
lent to expectation damages, does not alter parties’ legal rights or responsi-
bilities. And so, to the extent parties are unaware of an exit clause’s presence
in a contract, the clause is simply inert.
Because a legal requirement mandating an exit clause retains the sub-
stance of the contracting parties’ legal options, seeking to alter individual
moralists’ behavior only by morally reframing those options, neither effi-
ciency-based nor autonomy-based theories of contract have principled
grounds to reject a mandatory exit clause. Contract theorists committed to
promoting efficiency or increasing welfare should welcome a mandatory exit
term because it would result in individual moralists breaching their contracts
(or more precisely, exiting their contracts) when it would be efficient for
them to do so, thus increasing social welfare. Moreover, this strategy
achieves the increase in social welfare while also ameliorating distributional
inequalities by leveling up. That is, a legal framework that mandates exit
clauses will increase the welfare of the less-advantaged group relative to the
status quo without decreasing the welfare of the better-off group. This is be-
cause, by hypothesis, sophisticated Holmesians would be fully compensated
by any new efficient exits by individual moralists. Indeed, a mandatory exit
clause simply makes explicit the convergence theorists’ implicit revisionist
move. Shavell, Markovits, and Schwartz deployed that revisionist move to
interpret or imply into facially unqualified contracts precisely the same term
that this regulatory proposal would require contracts to include as an express
term. Autonomy-based theories of contract, like Fried’s or Kraus’s, can also
embrace the requirement that contracts include an exit clause. Such a clause
would resolve fairness and distributional concerns that autonomy-based
theorists are likely to care about. And importantly, the clause achieves those
ends without abridging autonomy because parties are still free to perform or
to pay,172 just as they are now. My proposal simply mandates an express con-
tractual term that creates an option, which the party can choose not to exer-
cise, and mirrors a background legal option both parties already possessed.
A divergence theorist like Seana Shiffrin, however, might advance a sub-
stantial objection based on the moral character of contractual promises.
Shiffrin argues that contract law’s traditional expectation remedy can be jus-
tified only on the basis of rationales that undermine a morally decent per-
son’s conception of a promise.173 The foundation of that objection is that the
proposal forces individuals to make promises-in-the-alternative by requiring
171 . See Lea Krivinskas Shepard, It’s All About the Principal: Preserving Consumers’ Right
of Rescission Under the Truth in Lending Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 171 (2010).
172. Again, for simplicity of expression, “perform” here means “perform the primary
obligation under the contract.”
173. Shiffrin, supra note 24, at 719.
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that they make contracts-in-the-alternative rather than truly and facially un-
qualified contracts.174 That objection, whatever its merits against the law’s
expectation remedy for unqualified contracts, fails to undermine the case for
the proposal of a required mandatory exit term. Shiffrin’s argument against
the traditional expectation remedy is that it reflects the law’s endorsement of
the view that it is morally permissible to break an unqualified promise and
merely pay off the disappointed promisee. But the law, should it adopt the
proposal, would not depend on such a contestable moral rationale. Rather
than suggesting it is morally permissible to break a promise and pay off the
promisee, it would instead require parties to make promises in the alterna-
tive thatmorally and legally permit payment in lieu of performance. Even if it
were morally wrong to break a promise and pay off the counterparty, the
proposal ensures that individuals (like their sophisticated Holmesian com-
patriots) may pay rather than perform without breaking a promise.
Shiffrin might modify her objection to claim that promises-in-the-
alternative are morally inferior to unqualified promises and that as a result
the proposal would force people to live their lives less virtuously. This modi-
fied objection focuses not on the fact that the exit term is mandatory but ra-
ther on the particular content of the mandatory term. A qualified promise-
in-the-alternative, Shiffrin might argue, is morally inferior to the more ful-
some promises individuals currently take themselves to have made: the
“worry” that “the contents of promises are indefinitely plastic and utterly up
to their makers.”175 As Shiffrin elaborates:
It is out of bounds to say: “I solemnly promise to do X, but I may fail to do
so if something better comes along; moreover, if it does, you can only ex-
pect X’s market value from me . . . .” . . . . Although one can declare within a
promise some of the conditions under which the promised performance
may not occur, those conditions cannot coherently extend so far as to in-
clude any situation in which the promisor has a change of heart or enter-
tains a better offer.176
In Barbara Fried’s reconstruction of Shiffrin’s worry, “when she says that it is
morally wrong for a contract to permit parties to avoid performance for a
price, she means that it is wrong however that option is phrased.”177
Perhaps the most natural response to this version of Shiffrin’s complaint
is simply to reject the intuition.178 But there is perhaps more merit to
174 . Id . at 740–49.
175 . Id . at 728.
176 . Id . at 728–29.
177. Barbara H. Fried, Response, What’s Morality Got to Do with It?, 120 HARV. L. REV.
F. 53, 57 (2007).
178. As Fried explains, Shiffrin’s “rhetoric bears much of the weight of the argument
here” because “much of Professor Shiffrin’s own discomfort with these utterances I believe
would disappear if identical limitations on liability were phrased in a different way.” Id . at 58.
In other words, Fried suggests the intuition driving Shiffrin’s objection is not, as Shiffrin sug-
gests, that all promises-in-the-alternative are morally inferior regardless of how the option to
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Shiffrin’s concern (as reconstructed by Fried) than may meet the eye. The
moral character of some promises depends essentially on their unqualified
nature. Consider, for example, a marriage contract. Despite the perhaps cyn-
ical modern realization that divorce is always an option, the moral character
of a marriage contract—and thus, on the individual moralist’s view, of a
marriage promise—would be fundamentally compromised if it were con-
verted by legal fiat into a contract and promise in the alternative. Even if that
express exit term to the marriage contract simply corresponded to a pre-
existing legal option of divorce, the promise that arose from that marriage
contract-in-the-alternative would be importantly different from—and by
most noncynics’ lights, morally inferior from—a typical unqualified mar-
riage contract.
But such contracts are a rarity. Most contracts—and in particular the
class of contracts to which the proposal is meant to apply—formalize com-
mercial transactions. And in the commercial context, it is hard to maintain
that contracts-in-the-alternative undermine the moral character of the cor-
responding commercial promise simply by virtue of being qualified to per-
mit payment in lieu of performance because, in large part, the underlying
function of the promise was already founded on the transfer of money. So
commercial contracts-in-the-alternative do not dishonor the promise by
pricing an exit, because the unqualified contract itself already priced the
promise. As a result, no one could plausibly think it is less morally virtuous
to opt for a cell phone contract with an explicit exit fee than an unqualified
cell phone contract that lacked such a provision. Thus, a regulatory require-
ment that commercial contracts include such a term does nothing to force us
to live less virtuously. Rather, the requirement could solve serious economic
and distributional problems while preserving individual autonomy.
2. Experimental Evidence on Exit Clauses
In theory, then, a mandatory exit clause can solve the problem of the
asymmetry in moral belief about breach in a way that should satisfy both ef-
ficiency and autonomy theories of contract. The remaining question is
whether an exit clause is actually effective in doing so. To answer this, I con-
ducted two experimental studies to test people’s likelihood to leave a con-
tract when it was in their financial interest to do so.179 The first study tested
pay is presented. The intuition is rather only that promises merely to perform-or-pay are mor-
ally inferior when the promisor presents that alternative promise in a morally repugnant man-
ner. And a regulatory requirement that contracts contain an exit term hardly constitutes the
sort of moral repugnance.
179. The study participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and
were compensated $1 for participating in the experiment. MTurk is an increasingly standard
platform for social scientists conducting social science research that offers promising external
validity. See Connor Huff & Dustin Tingley, “Who Are These People?” Evaluating the Demo-
graphic Characteristics and Political Preferences of MTurk Survey Respondents, RES. & POL.,
July–Sept. 2015, at 1, 8 (“[R]espondents on MTurk are not all that different from respondents
on other survey platforms.”).
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how likely people were to leave a contract with an exit clause, a contract with
a liquidated-damages clause, and a facially unqualified contract with neither
an exit clause nor a liquidated-damages clause. The second study tested peo-
ple’s responses in the particular context of mortgages by asking participants
how willing they would be to exit a mortgage contract with an express exit
clause versus breach a mortgage contract without such a clause.
The empirical findings of these studies support the conclusion that exit
clauses shift individuals’ moral perceptions by reframing the decision to pay
rather than perform. The results of the first study, reported below, indicate
that people are significantly more willing to exit a contract and pay a fee than
they are to breach a contract and pay damages. The results of the second
study, also reported below, indicate that people are also significantly more
likely to exercise an express exit clause in a mortgage when it is in their fi-
nancial interest to do so than they are to default on a mortgage when default
has identical legal and economic consequences. Participants’ comments in
both studies suggest that the reason for this difference is that exercising a
contractual option to exit a contract does not involve breaking a promise
and is therefore not immoral.
Methodology . The first study’s design is based on a similar study con-
ducted by Wilkinson-Ryan, which tested whether people would be more
willing to breach a contract with a liquidated-damages clause than a contract
without a liquidated-damages clause.180 Wilkinson-Ryan found that partici-
pants would be willing to breach a facially unqualified contract only if of-
fered approximately twice the amount of money it would take to make
breach and performance financially equivalent.181 By contrast, participants
reported that they would breach a contract with a liquidated-damages clause
for only approximately 1.35 times the amount of money it would take to
make breach and performance financially equivalent.182 Participants indicat-
ed that the presence of a liquidated-damages clause altered their views on the
moral permissibility of breach because it suggested the nonbreaching party
was on notice that breach was a possibility.183 Moreover, as with a disclosure
requirement, the presence of a liquidated-damages clause ensures that sub-
jects know that the nonbreaching party will receive compensation. Wil-
kinson-Ryan’s data also show that participants continued to require a sub-
stantial premium over the amount required to make breach and
performance equivalent in order to breach a contract with a liquidated-
damages clause.
My first study randomly assigned 722 participants to one of three varia-
tions of a vignette. The vignettes tell the participant that he or she has agreed
to a contract to sell concert tickets to a music fan for $200, but after the con-
180. Wilkinson-Ryan, Liquidated Damages, supra note 1, at 663–64. For a detailed de-
scription of Wilkinson-Ryan’s methodology, see id . at 655–69.
181 . Id . at 658–60.
182 . Id .
183 . Id . at 664.
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tract is signed another buyer offers to pay $500 for the tickets. Like Wil-
kinson-Ryan’s study, Scenario 1 presented participants with a control condi-
tion: the vignette with a facially unqualified contract, in which participants
were told the law of contracts would award the original buyer $100 in com-
pensation in the event of breach.184 Also like Wilkinson-Ryan’s study, Sce-
nario 2 presented participants with a liquidated-damages clause condition:
the same vignette, except with a contract that included a clause setting liqui-
dated damages at $100.185 I supplemented her study design by adding Sce-
nario 3: a contract that includes an exit clause creating a “right to cancel” the
contract if the participant pays a “fee” of $100.186 After reading the vignette,
participants were asked how likely they would be to breach (or exit) the con-
184. The full text of Scenario 1 read:
Imagine you purchased tickets to a concert by a very popular musician. Unfortu-
nately, due to a family commitment, it turns out you won’t be able to attend the concert.
You decide to sell the tickets through a local website where music fans often buy and
sell concert tickets. You and a buyer named Smith sign a contract to sell the tickets for
$200.
The day before the concert, another music fan named Jones contacts you and of-
fers to buy the tickets for $500. The concert is sold out and no other tickets are available
on the website. If you break your contract with the original buyer Smith, the law of con-
tracts will require you to pay Smith $100 as compensation for the cost of the babysitter
he had booked for the evening.
In total, if you break your contract with Smith and sell the tickets to Jones instead,
you will make $400 ($500 from the sale to Jones, minus the $100 you would owe Smith).
If you don’t break the contract with Smith, you will make only $200.
How likely are you to break the contract with Smith and sell the tickets to Jones
instead?
(1) Very unlikely.
(2) Somewhat unlikely.
(3) Neither likely nor unlikely.
(4) Somewhat likely.
(5) Very likely.
185. The text of Scenario 2 was identical to the text of Scenario 1, except instead of telling
participants the law of contracts would impose liability, it told participants the contract includ-
ed the following liquidated-damages clause: “If the seller of the tickets breaches this contract
for any reason, he or she will compensate the ticket buyer Smith in the amount of $100 to cov-
er the cost of the babysitter Smith will book for the evening.”
186. The text of Scenario 3 was identical to the text of Scenario 2, except it replaced the
liquidated-damages clause with the following exit clause:
“The seller of the tickets has a right to cancel this contract for any reason. If the
seller exercises the right to cancel this contract, he or she will pay the ticket buyer Smith
a fee in the amount of $100 to cover the cost of the babysitter Smith will book for the
evening.”
In addition, instead of asking participants how likely they were to “break” the con-
tract with Smith, it asked them: “How likely are you to exercise the right to cancel the
contract with Smith and sell the tickets to Jones instead?”
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tract. Once participants answered the question with respect to one of the
three scenarios, they were presented with the other two scenarios in turn to
answer the same question. This design permits both interpersonal compari-
sons, how unprimed participants respond to the first scenario they saw, and
intrapersonal comparisons, how a single individual responds to each of the
three scenarios. The study concluded by asking participants to comment on
whether breach of contract is immoral and whether the presence of an exit
clause makes a difference morally.
The second study tested participants’ propensity to breach or exit a
home mortgage. It randomly assigned 243 participants to one of two scenar-
ios. Both scenarios told participants that they owned a house with a mort-
gage whose balance was substantially greater than the market value of the
house and that as a result it was in their financial interest to stop making
payments on the mortgage. Under Scenario A, participants were told the
mortgage was “a standard mortgage” contract and that if they stopped mak-
ing payments on the mortgage they would have to turn over the house to
their lender in accordance with “real estate law.”187 Under Scenario B, partic-
ipants were told the mortgage included an express exit clause that specified
both that they had a “right to terminate” the mortgage and that if they exer-
cised the right to terminate they would have to turn over the house to the
lender.188 The legal and financial consequences were thus identical between
the scenarios. After each scenario, participants were asked how willing they
would be to stop making payments and to turn over the house to the lender.
As with the first study, after participants answered the question with respect
to one scenario, they were presented with the other scenario and asked the
187. The full text of Scenario 1 (excluding answer choices) read:
Please imagine you purchased a house using a standard mortgage. The value of re-
al estate has decreased significantly since you bought the house. Due to the steep decline
in the real estate market, the market price of your house is now much less than the re-
maining balance on your mortgage. As a result, it is in your financial interest to stop
making payments on the mortgage and turn over the house to your mortgage lender
pursuant to the real estate law.
How likely are you to stop making payments and turn over the house to your
lender?
188. The full text of Scenario 2 (excluding answer choices) read:
Please imagine you purchased a house using a mortgage with the following clause:
“You have a right to terminate this mortgage at any time. If you choose to exercise
the right to terminate this mortgage, you will be required to turn over the property that
secures the mortgage to your lender.”
The value of real estate has decreased significantly since you bought the house.
Due to the steep decline in the real estate market, the market price of your house is now
much less than the remaining balance on your mortgage. As a result, it is in your finan-
cial interest to stop making payments on the mortgage and turn over the house to your
mortgage lender pursuant to the clause in your mortgage contract.
How likely are you to stop making payments and turn over the house to your
lender?
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same question to allow for intrapersonal comparisons. And like the first
study, it concluded by asking participants to comment on whether breach of
contract is immoral and whether the presence of an exit clause makes a dif-
ference morally.
For both studies, participants’ responses were coded for statistical analy-
sis. A response of “very likely” was assigned a value of 5; “somewhat likely” a
value of 4; “neither likely nor unlikely” a value of 3; “somewhat unlikely” a
value of 2; and “very unlikely” a value of 1.
Results . The results of the first study show that the presence of an exit
clause had a significant effect on participants’ willingness to breach or exit a
contract. Looking first at the interpersonal data,189 participants were more
likely to exercise an exit clause than to breach a contract with a liquidated-
damages clause or a contract with neither. Participants’ mean response to
Scenario 1, in which the contract had neither an exit clause nor a liquidated-
damages clause, was 2.88. Participants’ mean response to Scenario 2, in
which the contract had a liquidated-damages clause, was 2.98. Finally, partic-
ipants’ mean response to Scenario 3, in which the contract had an exit clause,
was 3.29. Those data are summarized in the following chart:
The difference between participants’ mean responses to the exit clause
scenario and the control scenario was 0.41,190 while the difference between
their mean responses to the liquidated-damages scenario and the control
scenario was statistically insignificant and only 0.1.191 The data thus suggest
that the effect of an exit clause is four times as powerful as the effect of a liq-
189. That is, comparing participants’ responses to the first scenario they viewed.
190. The difference between participants’ responses to the exit clause scenario and the
control scenario was statistically significant (t = −2.7904, df = 480.71, p-value = 0.005474).
191. The difference between participants’ responses to the liquidated-damages clause
scenario and the control scenario was not statistically significant (t = −0.70461, df = 479.35, p-
value = 0.4814).
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uidated-damages clause.192 The data also showed a strong intrapersonal ef-
fect.193 On average, a participant’s response to the exit clause scenario was .43
higher than his or her response to the control scenario.194
The second study showed that the presence of an exit clause in a mort-
gage contract had a similarly significant effect. Looking first at the interper-
sonal data, participants were more likely to exercise an exit clause in a mort-
gage contract than to breach a mortgage contract. Participants’ mean
response to Scenario A, in which the participants considered a standard
mortgage contract without an exit clause, was 2.74. Participants’ mean re-
sponse to Scenario B, in which the mortgage contract had an exit clause, was
3.15. Those data are summarized in the following chart:
The difference between participants’ mean responses to the exit clause
scenario and the control scenario was again 0.41.195 The data also again
showed a strong intrapersonal effect. On average, a participant’s response to
the exit clause scenario was 0.30 higher than his or her response to the con-
trol scenario.196 The effect of an exit clause on the decision whether to stay in
the mortgage contract affected a substantial proportion of participants: the
percentage of participants who were either “extremely likely” or “somewhat
likely” to breach a mortgage contract was 35%, while the percentage of par-
ticipants who were either “extremely likely” or “somewhat likely” to exercise
an exit clause in a mortgage contract increased to 53%.197 In other words, the
192. Because both effects are based on finite sample sizes, and therefore subject to confi-
dence intervals, the relative magnitude of those effects could be somewhat higher or lower.
193. That is, comparing how individual participants responded to all three scenarios.
194. The single-value p-test showed this effect was statistically significant (t = 10.088,
df = 721, p-value < 2.2 × 10-16).
195. The difference between participants’ responses to the exit clause scenario and the
control scenario was statistically significant (t = −2.4007 df = 240.93, p-value = 0.01712).
196. The single-value p-test showed this effect was statistically significant (t = 4.5562,
df = 242, p-value = 0.000008265).
197. The difference in percentages was statistically significant (t = −2.8379, df = 240.9, p-
value = 0.004928).
938 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:885
presence of an exit clause shifted 18% of participants to be somewhat or ex-
tremely likely to leave an underwater mortgage who otherwise would be un-
willing to breach.
These results indicate that a mandatory exit clause can successfully align
the moral perceptions of individual moralists with firms’ Holmesian per-
spective on breach. That impact could have substantial practical implica-
tions, particularly in consumer contracts and mortgage contracts. By align-
ing individuals’ moral belief about exiting the contract with the breaching
behavior of Holmesians, a mandatory exit clause could free consumers and
borrowers from contracts to which they feel morally bound when exit would
release them from substantial economic burdens. If 18% more of the mil-
lions of homeowners whose mortgages were underwater in the aftermath of
the housing crisis had exercised a right to exit those mortgages, homeowners
in aggregate might have saved billions of dollars. But the moral point is per-
haps more sharply stated when we focus on individuals: each homeowner
might have saved tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars. For most
people, especially those whose financial situation was already precarious,
that would have been a life-changing financial salvation.
CONCLUSION
The moral diversity of beliefs about the permissibility of breach creates
significant social and moral costs. The asymmetry in moral belief between
individuals and sophisticated parties like firms results in inefficient out-
comes and unfair distributions. This Article addressed the implications of
the asymmetry and evaluated prospects for legal reform to address those im-
plications. Traditional doctrinal tools to calibrate legal actors’ incentives by
adjusting the remedies for breach are unlikely to make much headway in the
problem. Disclosure requirements probably will not help much either. The
most promising approach is a mandatory exit term that explicitly permits
payment instead of performance. Because an express exit term would alter
the substantive scope of individual perceptions of moral obligations to keep
contractual promises, these individuals may be more likely to breach effi-
ciently. That modified breaching behavior would respect individuals’ moral
views while resolving both the inefficiency and unfairness that asymmetry in
moral belief creates under the legal and regulatory status quo. Experimental
evidence bears out that theoretical conclusion: people are significantly more
likely to exercise an exit clause in a contract when it is in their financial in-
terest than they are to breach a contract, even when the economic conse-
quences are identical. These results point the way to a promising solution to
an underappreciated public policy problem in the regulation of contracts.
